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ing, or behavioral reconstruction.
Contemporary with this development has been the introduction into archaeology and ethnography of a 1. For comments on earlier versions of this paper, we thank Don body of theory known as evolutionary or behavioral Grayson, Bob Leonard, Jim O'Connell, Ann Ramenofsky, Julie ecology (e.g., Bettinger 1980 , 1991 Hegmon 1989; Kelly Stein, Bruce Winterhalder, and four anonymous reviewers. We are grateful to Ramenofsky and Winterhalder for permission to quote 1995; Metcalf and Barlow 1992; Mithen 1989a Mithen , 1990 ; from unpublished manuscripts. We have no doubt that each of O'Connell 1995; Russell 1988 ; Winterhalder and Smith these scholars disagrees with at least something in this paper, but 1981; Smith and Winterhalder 1992a; for a comprehenthey have been gracious critics nonetheless. In any case, we are sive overview, see Krebs and Davies 1991 or 1997) . Evosolely responsible for the errors, opinions, and interpretations expressed herein. lutionary ecology explains cultural and behavioral S141 S142 c u r r e n t a n t h r o p o l o g y Volume 39, Supplement, June 1998 change as forms of phenotypic adaptation to varying so-lutionary ecology, the issue of whether behavioral variation is undirected with respect to adaptive value cial and ecological conditions, using the assumption that natural selection has designed organisms to re-(including the related issues of current versus future selective advantage and the explanatory role of inten-spond to local conditions in fitness-enhancing ways. Taking this assumption of adaptive design as a starting tions). Finally, we contrast the evolutionary archaeological approach to explaining archaeological change with point, evolutionary ecologists formulate and test formal models incorporating specific optimization goals, cur-that of evolutionary ecology, using the origins of plant domestication as a heuristic example. We conclude rencies, and constraints.
Judging from the virtual lack of cross-referencing in with a brief assessment of the archaeological promise of each approach. the literature, these two programs seem to view each other as irrelevant at best and mutually exclusive or even antagonistic at worst. How can it be that two programs that derive from the same overarching theoreti-What Is Evolving? Replicators cal framework-Darwinism-arrive at such different views on how to describe and explain the archaeological and Phenotypes record? We argue that the primary conflict between the two approaches centers on fundamental differences in In modern synthetic Darwinian theory, evolutionary change proceeds through the action of natural selection the way they view the role of phenotypic variation, and in particular behavioral variation, in the evolutionary and other forces (e.g., mutation, drift) on genotypic variation and its phenotypic expression. Of these, only se-process. From these differences flow a series of consequences in explanatory scope, empirical application, lection produces cumulative, directional (nonrandom), and creative evolution. As noted by Lewontin (1970) and theoretical conclusions. The aim of this paper is to outline these differences and to evaluate the relative and many others (e.g., Dunnell 1980:38) , in outline natural selection requires only three conditions: variation, utility of each approach for explaining archaeological phenomena.
inheritance (transmission), and differential fitness. But because of the translation between genotype and pheno-Although the relationship between evolutionary archaeology and evolutionary ecology may seem to be a type-a process inextricably linked to environmental and developmental factors-and the complexities of in-rather arid academic dispute turning on some esoteric points of evolutionary theory, we feel that the implica-heritance wherever sexual reproduction is present, the simplicity of evolution by natural selection is nested tions for future research in archaeology and on culture change generally are quite broad. If the proponents of within an extremely complex ontogenetic and populational context. Thus, a somewhat fuller outline of the evolutionary archaeology are correct, a clean sweep of existing paradigms in archaeology and even ethnogra-evolutionary process would be as follows: (1) genetic variation is continually produced by mutation and re-phy is scientifically warranted. Given the powerful, unifying role of Darwinian theory in the life sciences combination; (2) this variation interacts with external environmental factors to shape phenotypes; (3) these and the fractured state of theory in the social sciences, evolutionary archaeology's claim to the mantle of Dar-phenotypes and associated genotypes are differentially successful in surviving and reproducing; (4) offspring in-winism comes at a significant moment in the history of anthropology. For this reason, we have endeavored to herit (some of) the genes and thus tend to develop the associated phenotypes of their parents; (5) the prolifera-use the simplest, least ambiguous language possible in order to make this critique accessible to a broad audi-tion of more successful genotypes results in transgenerational increase in phenotypes that are better adapted ence of professionals who may not have expertise in archaeology or evolutionary theory. Of course, there are to local environments.
In adopting the Darwinian framework, evolutionary other critiques of evolutionary archaeology in the recent literature (e.g., Schiffer 1996), but unlike these our archaeologists have simply substituted phenotypic variation for genetic, arguing that evolution by natural se-critique is rooted in an acceptance of the general Darwinian framework; in other words, we locate the weak-lection applies to any population of entities characterized by heritable variation and differential replication ness of evolutionary archaeology in its flawed grasp of evolutionary biology rather than in its advocacy of Dar-success of the variants. They further argue that since artifacts are a component of the human phenotype, winism per se.
We begin with a brief outline of the fundamental changes in artifact frequencies through time can be explained by the same principles used in evolutionary bi-logic of natural selection, noting the critical distinction between phenotypes (such as behavioral patterns) and ology, that is, the action of selection on phenotypic variation. This position is clearly stated in various pas-replicators (such as genes). We argue that in many cases the process that evolutionary archaeologists are calling sages (e.g., Leonard and Jones 1987:213; O'Brien and Holland 1992:37) , including the following: ''Artifacts do ''selection'' is not selection at all but phenotypic adaptation to environmental variation; we illustrate this not 'represent' or 'reflect' something else that is amenable to evolutionary theory; they are a part of the human process using two examples from the archaeological and ethnographic records. We then take up a central dis-phenotype. Consequently, artifact frequencies are explicable by the same processes as those in biology'' agreement between evolutionary archaeology and evo-b oone a nd s mith Critique of Evolutionary Archaeology S143 (Dunnell 1989:45) . In this view, the forces or processes sary nor is a knowledge of the source of variability'' (Dunnell 1980:62) . that give rise to phenotypic variation are unimportant to the analysis of evolutionary change. All that matters
In his recent paper entitled, provocatively enough, ''What Is It That Actually Evolves? '' Dunnell (1995) dis-is that variation have some heritable component and that this variation have differential fitness effects such cusses the possible evolutionary relationships between individuals, species, assemblages, and societies but that natural selection can occur. In evolutionary archaeological theory, the production of new phenotypic vari-never acknowledges the replicator-phenotype distinction or the issues raised by nonparental cultural trans-ation (including novel forms of behavior or artifacts) is seen as conceptually analogous to the process by which mission. This omission is striking given the central role that these matters have played in contemporary evolu-new variants arise in the genetic code-undirected mutation and recombination. tionary theory in general and cultural evolutionary theory in particular (e.g., Dawkins 1976 , Hamilton 1996 , Although seemingly straightforward, this approach to evolution by natural selection makes some very prob-Sober 1984, Trivers 1985, and Williams 1966 for biology; Boyd and Richerson 1985, Cavalli-Sforza and Feld-lematic assumptions. Foremost among these is the way it handles the genotype-phenotype distinction. To be man 1981, Dennett 1996, and Durham 1991 for cultural evolution). By making artifacts the evolutionary unit sure, the heritability requirement does not specify that inheritance be genetic; it could in principle be cultural subject to variation and selection, evolutionary archaeologists are either ignoring the replicator-phenotype (the standard view in evolutionary archaeology). But selection does require that there be replicators-units of distinction and all its implications or proposing that artifacts themselves are replicators; either position is heritable variation. As Dawkins (1978; 1982:81-117) and others (e.g., Hull 1980) have pointed out, replicators highly problematic.
In biology, phenotypes are defined as the observable must have certain causally significant qualities: longevity (they last for many generations), fecundity (they pro-result of the interaction between genotype and environment (Mayr 1976:10)-essentially all features of an or-duce copies of themselves), and copy fidelity (they are replicated with near-perfect accuracy). Genes, con-ganism except its genes. Obviously, behavior is included in this encompassing definition, even behavior sisting of DNA, and memes or ''culturgens'' (symbolically or neurologically encoded information transmit-that is culturally transmitted. Evolutionary archaeological theorists have argued that artifacts, being ''the ted via social learning) are the two most commonly identified replicators. 2 equivalents of physical and behavioral traits'' (Leonard and Jones 1987:215) , are what Dunnell (1989:44) has The particulate nature of inheritance-the crucial fact that individuals (phenotypes, or ''vehicles,'' as colorfully termed ''the hard parts of the behavioral segment of phenotypes.'' Recently, some evolutionary ar-Dawkins terms them) do not themselves replicate but are dissolved each generation-has profound implica-chaeologists have employed Dawkins's (1978 Dawkins's ( , 1982 notion of the ''extended phenotype'' as a justification for tions for evolutionary theory (e.g., Williams 1966 , Dawkins 1982 , Sterelny and Kitcher 1988 . For one, it means viewing artifacts as phenotypic traits, arguing that just as biologists ''routinely include such things as spider that selection will generally design individuals to behave in ways that will lead to maximal representation webs and bird nests in their concept of phenotype, we see no reason not to extend in similar fashion the no-of replicators in future generations. This in turn focuses analytical attention on the relationships between repli-tion of the human phenotype to include such things as projectile points and pottery, or . . . such artifacts as cer-cators, vehicles, and phenotypic traits; all these elements play crucial but quite distinctive roles in biologi-emonial architecture'' (O'Brien and Holland 1995:181) .
But if behavior and its products (artifacts) are pheno-cal evolution.
How has evolutionary archaeology dealt with this typic-a position we agree with-then in order to apply Darwinian analysis to them we must determine what critical issue? According to Dunnell (1980:87) , ''Perhaps the most fundamental problem in developing evolu-replicators are associated with them. More fundamental, Darwinian analysis must examine the ways in tionary theory for cultural phenomena is the matter of the unit of transmission. . . . Yet if evolutionary theory which phenotypic traits affect the replication success of their associated replicators. Since evolutionary archae-is to be applied in archaeology with any rigor at all, this issue has to be addressed in concrete terms.'' Despite ology has failed to do so, there is no logical foundation for Dunnell's (1989:45) claim (quoted above) or the fol-this pronouncement, the mechanics of inheritance and their critical consequences for the form that evolution-lowing: ''Since selection works on the phenotype-the vehicle that carries and protects the germ-line repli-ary processes take have been virtually ignored in the evolutionary archaeological literature (with the notable cators (the genes)-then, with regard to humans, those things they manufacture and use to modify their envi-exception of Neiman 1995). Indeed, we are told that the specific mechanisms of inheritance are irrelevant: ronment are subject to selection in the same way any somatic feature is'' (O'Brien and Holland 1995:181) . The ''knowledge of how inheritance is effected is not necesproblem with this conceptualization is that selection can act on phenotypic variation (e.g., artifact design and 2. Other nominees for replicator status include immunological anfrequency) only to the extent that it is heritable-that tigens (Burnet 1959, Ada and Nossal 1987) and neural circuits in Edelman's (1987) ''neural Darwinism'' theory of learning.
is, correlated with replicators transmitted from parent S144 c u r r e n t a n t h r o p o l o g y Volume 39, Supplement, June 1998 to offspring (or, in the case of cultural replicators, from traits or heritable variances of traits) is correspondingly great. model to recipient). The evolutionary archaeological program assumes this correlation without further ex-Behavior is typically the most labile component of an organism's phenotype. As contemporary evolutionary amination and often without even articulating the assumption. Furthermore, given that evolutionary archae-biologists see it, the evolutionary raison d'ê tre of behavior is to allow organisms greater flexibility in re-ology is positing cultural inheritance, its failure to pay attention to the effect of cultural transmission path-sponding to variable environmental challenges in ways that enhance survival and reproduction (Dawkins 1976: ways (e.g., parental versus nonparental, generational versus peer-to-peer, one-to-many versus many-to-one) chap. 4; Pulliam and Dunford 1980:chaps. 1-3). In other words, behavioral plasticity allows organisms to adapt as well as secondary forces such as evolved preferences is puzzling. Though its proponents often cite the theo-to changes in environmental conditions more rapidly than they could through the process of selection acting retical literature on cultural evolution (e.g., Boyd and Richerson 1985, Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman 1981, Dur-on genetic variation. Thus, even though this plasticity exacts fitness costs (in terms of development, metabolic ham 1991), they do not discuss the conclusion of this theory that cultural transmission might sometimes pro-maintenance, and potential malfunction), in particular niches it more than repays these costs and hence has duce evolutionary trajectories that differ radically from those governing traits linked to Mendelian inheritance. evolved by natural selection.
Evolutionary ecology generally analyzes phenotypic Evolutionary ecology takes a different and conceptually more complex but realistic view of phenotypic vari-variation in terms of ''adaptive strategies''-that is, as a series of fitness-enhancing behavioral responses to dif-ation. It holds that organisms (including humans) have been designed by selection to make extensive adaptive ferent environmental states (assuming that these states have been recurrent within the evolutionary history of adjustments of their phenotypes. A nonbehavioral example of this is the tanning response found in all but the organism's lineage and that the responses fall within its norm of reaction). This form of phenotypic the darkest-skinned or albino people. Tanning is clearly phenotypic variation, even when it involves historical, response is thus construed to be based on a set of evolved ''decision rules'' (Krebs 1978)-genetically intergenerational change (e.g., a population that has gone from working in the fields to working in factories evolved cognitive mechanisms that guide development, learning, problem solving, and stimulus response. and exhibits a diachronic shift in the frequency or intensity of tanning). In the behavioral realm, this process Hence, in this view behavioral variation itself is not the direct product of natural selection. Rather, selection en-of adaptive phenotypic variation involves the interaction between genetically or culturally evolved cognitive ters the explanation only indirectly, as the process that designed the behaving organism (or in fact its ancestors) mechanisms and variable environmental conditions. Under this view, natural selection's primary role lies in to respond facultatively and adaptively to particular environmental conditions. accounting for these cognitive mechanisms-that is, why they evolved and why they work the way they Most writers of both approaches seem to agree on the theoretical importance of cultural transmission to an do-and not in culling behavioral variation. Correspondingly, environment plays a causal role in eliciting evolutionary understanding of historical change. For example, without it evolutionary archaeology could make phenotypic variation, not just a selective one after the fact. In colloquial terms, the evolutionary ecological po-no claim that phenotypic variation is heritable, one of the three essential requirements of the theory of evolu-sition is nothing more than a claim that organisms have problem-solving abilities at various levels (physiologi-tion by natural selection. At the same time, the two approaches diverge in their treatment of phenotypic traits. cal, morphological, behavioral) and scales (short-term, developmental, lifelong) .
Evolutionary archaeology treats these (especially artifacts) as both vehicles (phenotypic) and replicators (di-A phenotype's tendency or capacity to respond differentially to varying environmental conditions is called rectly subject to natural selection). In contrast, evolutionary ecology expects the transmission of cultural phenotypic plasticity (or lability). The phenotypic plasticity of a given replicator (e.g., genotype) over a range of variants to be heavily influenced by previously evolved cognitive biases or decision rules. If the latter view is environmental conditions is termed its reaction norm (Lewontin 1974:404; Stearns 1992:61-65) . In this correct, frequency changes in these variants over time may be caused by factors other than concurrent natural view-standard within biology in general, including evolutionary ecology-phenotypic variation that re-selection. sults from the interaction of genotype with environment does not itself constitute evolutionary change, though an organism's capacity for adaptive phenotypic Selection or Phenotypic Adaptation? Two plasticity is an evolved trait shaped by natural selection. If the phenotype's reaction norm is very broad, the Examples from the Archaeological Record potential for synchronic variation or diachronic change in the phenotype without any evolutionary change per Evolutionary ecologists and evolutionary archaeologists seem to agree that ''natural selection is the primary ex-se (i.e., without changes in the frequency of heritable b oone a nd s mith Critique of Evolutionary Archaeology S145 planatory mechanism in scientific evolution'' (Dunnell nisms of phenotypic adaptation privileged in evolutionary ecology. 1980:49) . Selection operates as a mechanism or process of evolutionary change in a population when some vari-Behavioral variation of the type just discussed will produce corresponding variation in the kinds and fre-able heritable trait has correspondingly variable effects on the fitness of the individuals that inherit it. For ex-quencies of artifacts and ecofacts associated with these behaviors, including those which become part of the ar-ample, one major component of fitness is the number of offspring that survive to reproduce; parents that pro-chaeological record. Hence, the resulting variation and directional change that we observe archaeologically duce more surviving offspring relative to others in the same population are said to have higher reproductive cannot be assumed to have resulted from natural selection acting on culturally transmitted variation; it could success. A heritable trait that causes its bearers to have higher reproductive success than others in the popula-instead be the result of facultative behavioral strategies that are themselves the product of earlier evolutionary tion will increase in frequency within the population over time.
processes extending back thousands or millions of years. Thus, if we wish to explain variation in the ar-Evolutionary archaeologists have tended to consider all directional phenotypic change through time as the chaeological record (or any other manifestation of human behavior), we have at least two alternatives: we result of natural selection acting directly on cultural variation (Dunnell 1978) . Yet most of the evolutionary can attribute this variation to the action of natural selection on adaptively random cultural variation (the archaeological literature is quite unclear on the mechanism(s) underlying selection. Some (e.g., O'Brien and evolutionary archaeological program), or we can attribute it to adaptive phenotypic variation (the evolution- Holland 1995:190-91; Ramenofsky 1995:135-39) suggest that selection works via reproductive differences ary ecological program).
In sum, analyzing synchronic variation or diachronic among the individuals who utilize certain variable artifacts to interact with the environment. Others (e.g., change requires that we consider two distinct causal processes, one evolutionary and the other phenotypic. Leonard and Jones 1987:214; Jones, Leonard, and Abbott 1995:28-29; Teltser 1995a:5-6) argue that it is replica-Evolutionary ecologists tend to focus on strategic phenotypic response and assume that the trait under study tive success of phenotypic traits (behavior or artifacts) that matters, whether or not this is tied to reproductive has been designed by natural selection to have sufficient phenotypic plasticity to track environmental vari-success. Sometimes this ambiguity concerning the mechanism(s) of selection is directly indicated, as in ation optimally (i.e., in fitness-maximizing ways).
Hence, they do not equate phenotypic variation with Jones et al.'s (p. 26) reference to ''functional traits, and the processes that influence their differential survival, evolutionary change; instead, they attribute it to evolved capacities for adaptive variation (behavioral, collectively termed selection.'' Most selectionists simply avoid stating a position on the issue or do not rec-physiological, etc.). The evolutionary archaeological paradigm, in contrast, minimizes the role of phenotypic ognize it as an issue. 3 In contrast, evolutionary ecology argues that selec-adaptation via decision making and ascribes adaptive change to the action of natural selection on culturally tion acting on heritable variation is but one of several processes by which changes in the frequency of pheno-inherited phenotypic variation. Neither view is likely to be 100% correct, but we argue that the evolutionary typic variants through time occurs. As we have suggested, one of the most important of these processes is ecological approach is likely to explain a much larger proportion of the phenotypic change preserved in the ar-individual phenotypic variation in response to environmental variation such as exogenous changes in prey chaeological and ethnographic records. We will now examine this issue and illustrate these principles with ref-abundance, climate change, and the like-in other words, nongenetic adaptation to local (and locally vari-erence to two cases of historical change. able) conditions. Evolutionary ecology also proposes that the aggregate consequences of individual phenothe emergence of broad-spectrum foraging typic adaptation can both change environmental conin the archaic ditions-as through increases in population density, resource depletion, habitat modification, or mate Our first example concerns changes in prey choice that are revealed in the archaeological record of the North availability-and elicit new strategic phenotypic adaptation to these altered conditions. Thus, quite complex American Archaic. This period is generally characterized by a major shift in hunting emphasis from large-and directional changes in phenotypic variation over historical time are expected to result from the mecha-bodied game to smaller prey and in many cases a greater emphasis on gathering and processing of wild plant foods (Bayham 1979) . This trend has been closely docu-3. Recently, some evolutionary archaeologists (Jones, Leonard, and Abbott 1995:28; Ramenofsky 1995) have suggested that nonran-mented in Central California by Broughton (1994); a dom or directional frequency change of traits can also be due to parallel trend occurred in many regions of the Old ''sorting'' (differential persistence of evolved lineages [Vrba and World during the Mesolithic. In the language of foraging Gould 1986]) or some other type of correlation with traits undergotheory, the trend can be characterized in terms of an ining selection. To date, however, no publication has explored the archaeological implications of this proposed mechanism.
crease in diet breadth (Broughton 1994:501) , wherein S146 c u r r e n t a n t h r o p o l o g y Volume 39, Supplement, June 1998 ''change in emphasis'' is defined as a process by which plements, and facilities for capturing, processing, and storing the animal and plant foods that were added to human foragers broaden the range of prey taken by progressively adding lower-ranked (i.e., less efficiently har-the diet. Since the techniques for making and using such implements must have spread through some pro-vested) prey types to a previously narrower diet of higher-ranked prey types (Smith 1983a, Kaplan and Hill cess of cultural transmission-that is, we do not imagine that each Archaic forager reinvented, say, the side-1992).
Why would humans expand their prey choice to in-notched point or seed-beater basketry as needed-one might argue that here is where evolutionary archaeolo-clude lower-ranked prey types? Broughton (1994 Broughton ( , 1995 uses optimal foraging theory to generate a number of gy's selectionist paradigm should come into full play.
But again, we must keep in mind that natural selection hypotheses about patterns of prehistoric prey choice in Central California, including the central one that a de-acting on culturally transmitted variation is not necessarily the only or even the most important process re-cline in the abundance of more profitable (higherranked) large-bodied prey, such as artiodactyls (deer and sponsible for the spread of innovations and corresponding artifact frequency changes. From the evolutionary elk) and sea otters, led to an expansion of the optimal (and hence observed) diet to include more lower-ranked ecological perspective, adaptive phenotypic plasticity (decision making and selective imitation) is a more prey such as shellfish, small game, and fish. Broughton suggests that the per-capita decline in high-ranked prey plausible alternative.
To illustrate this point we shift our attention to a was due to long-term increase in human population density, but the optimal-prey-choice model would pre-more recent example of technological change in foraging strategies that allows us to examine the actual pro-dict the same broadening of the diet in the case of anthropogenic resource depletion. Climatic change may cess of change in more detail. In an article on Native American artifact replacement by European goods, Ra-also have been responsible for this decline in highranked prey in some regions. menofsky (n.d.) posits that the rapid increase in European horses in the 16th century and the Cree use of Whatever the cause, foraging theory predicts that reduced encounter rates for higher-ranked resources will snowmobiles (Winterhalder 1980 (Winterhalder , 1981 are ''clear examples of variants that increase due to selection'' (n.d.: eventually shift the optimal (efficiency-maximizing) diet breadth to include lower-ranked (higher-cost) re-7, emphasis added). With respect to the Cree use of snowmobiles, we are in a good position to examine this sources (Charnov 1976, Stephens and Krebs 1986) . This is because the increased search time resulting from de-claim more closely.
At the time of his field study (which took place in clining encounter rates for high-ranked prey reduces the overall return rate for specializing on such prey relative 1975), Winterhalder found that snowmobiles had come into general use among the Boreal Forest Cree, with to the returns that can be obtained from expanding the diet to include lower-ranked but more frequently en-considerable effect on their foraging strategies. If Ramenofsky's claim that this process is due to selection countered prey types. 4 Thus, evolutionary ecology explains the trend toward broad-spectrum foraging in the rather than decision making is correct, we must imagine the following course of events to have occurred: Archaic in terms of the long-term aggregate consequences of changing individual decisions of Archaic First, some Cree foragers adopted, for whatever reasons, the use of snowmobiles in hunting, while others contin-foragers in response to declining availability of largebodied animals. From this perspective, adaptive pheno-ued to walk to hunting sites on snowshoes. The snowmobile users then experienced higher fitness in the typic flexibility (decision making) is entirely sufficient to explain the trend in question, and no appeal to selec-form of larger numbers of surviving offspring, perhaps because of greater foraging returns that could be used to tion acting on cultural variation is necessary. Natural selection is required only to explain why Archaic forag-feed more offspring or because of higher return rates that freed time to engage in other fitness-increasing ac-ers (in common with human and nonhuman foragers everywhere) have evolved the cognitive capabilities to tivities, such as mating, child care, and wage earning.
Snowmobile use was then transmitted culturally to the make adaptive economic decisions.
offspring of snowmobile adopters. Since hunting resources are ultimately limited, the resulting increase in snowmobiles in the subarctic snowmobile use eventually led to replacement of snowshoe hunters by snowmobile users. The above example of adaptive change centered largely around changes in resource choice. Of course, the Ar-Clearly, the process just outlined would be quite slow, requiring many generations to result in the re-chaic and Mesolithic periods are also characterized by the appearance and spread of a wide range of tools, im-placement of snowshoe hunting by snowmobiles, the number of generations depending upon the fitness dif-4. There are significant complications involved in applying this ferential between snowmobile users and traditional optimal-prey-choice logic to central-place foragers utilizing multihunters. Yet Winterhalder (1981:88) reports that the ple patches; these issues are reviewed in general terms by Stephens Cree adopted snowmobiles over the space of less than and Krebs (1986), Smith (1991), and Kaplan and Hill (1992) and disone human generation. Hence, it seems clear to us that cussed in detail for the prehistoric California case by Broughton (1995) .
the rapid increase of snowmobile use, contra Ramenof-b oone a nd s mith Critique of Evolutionary Archaeology S147 sky, cannot be due to the effect of natural selection act-evolved cognitive capabilities that allow them to perceive the relative efficiency of different means (e.g., ing on variation in locomotion techniques among the Cree.
snowmobiles versus snowshoes) for acquiring resources and to make decisions regarding adoption of new tech-Two objections to our argument might be raised at this point. First, given the short time involved, one nology or patterns of behavior according to which will produce the highest net gains. 5 might question whether Ramenofsky really means that natural selection is the process or mechanism responsi-We argue that adopting such an explanatory strategy allows for a much richer analysis of change as well. For ble for the increase in the frequency of snowmobile use. Our interpretation that she does is bolstered by her re-example, Winterhalder argued that the Cree adopted snowmobiles because doing so increased foraging effi-cent discussion of the spread of the horse among historic Plains Indians (1995:138-39, emphasis added):
ciency by reducing the amount of time it took to travel from settlements to hunting areas; in optimal foraging terms, snowmobiles decrease prey search time. Using Within 100 years of its introduction, the horse had diffused as far east as Texas, north into Canada, and the optimal foraging framework allowed Winterhalder to make various predictions regarding changes in the south into Mexico (Ewers 1955) . This rapidity suggests that the horse was a functional trait that variety and range of prey taken upon encounter with the adoption of snowmobiles. Specifically, an increase in greatly increased the fitness of individuals within populations. The strength of the horse out-com-search efficiency is predicted to result in a constriction of the diet (1981:89); Cree hunters using motorized peted humans and dogs as a means of transport; the speed of the horse gave it a unique advantage in transport should concentrate on more profitable prey such as moose and ignore lower-ranking prey with hunting. Consequently, individuals who owned horses reproduced in greater numbers than others.
lower return rates such as hare. As it turned out, Winterhalder was able to confirm that Cree diet was broader prior to the adoption of snowmobiles and outboards. We Clearly Ramenofsky sees the advantages of horses as leading to their spread through natural selection (of cul-note that without the evolutionary ecological postulate that evolved cognitive abilities allow foragers to weigh tural variation) rather than through adaptive decision making, and since she has recently (n.d.) linked this the economic costs and benefits of various tactics and strategies and to choose the tactic or strategy that gives case with the Cree shift from snowshoes to snowmobiles and termed both the result of ''selection,'' we the highest energy return under the circumstances, the intimate strategic relationship between foraging tech-think our interpretation of what she means by ''selection'' is correct.
nology and diet breadth would remain theoretically opaque. Second, one might question whether ''selection'' on cultural variation must act through differences in biological reproduction. As discussed in detail by cultural discriminating phenotypic from evolution theorists (e.g., Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman evolutionary change 1981, Boyd and Richerson 1985), since cultural inheritance is not limited to parent-offspring transmission, It might be argued that, if natural selection and adaptive decision making have the same outcome (e.g., snowmo-the replication rate of memes need not be constrained by the generation length of culture bearers. Thus, some bile adoption) and enhance fitness in either case, it doesn't matter whether we adopt the evolutionary ar-memes may spread ''horizontally'' (e.g., between peers) or even ''obliquely'' (from elders to various sets of non-chaeological or the evolutionary ecological explanation. Now, it is true that adaptive decision making over a descendant juniors) in a rapid fashion more akin to epidemics than to genetic inheritance. However, if (as in short time scale may produce results (including fitness effects) that are equivalent to the effect of natural selec-the example discussed here) the postulated evolutionary mechanism is natural selection, then differential tion acting over longer time scales. This is largely because capabilities for phenotypic adaptation (including transmission requires heritable variation in individual survival and/or individual reproductive success, and adaptive decision making) are themselves the product of past natural selection. However, this does not mean therefore generation length becomes an important ratelimiting constraint. The alternative that ''snowmobile that the two processes of adaptive change should be memes'' were transmitted more effectively than ''snowshoe memes'' to nondescendant Cree (as well as off-5. Just how detailed and fine-tuned these cognitive mechanisms are spring), while plausible, is not natural selection; more and how they are shaped by inheritance or learning are empirical significant, it requires precisely the kind of adaptive dematters that evolutionary ecologists are continually investigating cision making that evolutionary archaeology is dediin humans and nonhumans. For example, how closely can people or other organisms discriminate different mean rates of energy cated to eliminating from archaeological explanation. gain, given variance in these rates over time? How extensively are How, then, can we characterize this process of change other components of fitness (e.g., mortality risk) traded off against within the framework of evolutionary theory? We resource capture rate? What are the relative roles of genetic and would argue that increased snowmobile use is the result cultural inheritance in shaping these decision rules? We think it premature to take strong positions on these issues. of the fact that Cree hunters, like all humans, inherit S148 c u r r e n t a n t h r o p o l o g y Volume 39, Supplement, June 1998 conflated or that we can assume they will always pro-ance of individual behaviors, the same notions should allow us to predict mutations, a patently duce the same outcomes. The reasons for this have some rather far-reaching implications for how we absurd notion. should view variation, selection, and evolutionary This statement illustrates the reasoning by which this change.
approach rejects any explanatory paradigm which in-First, natural selection results in trait frequency cludes decision making or adaptive response. It is ultichanges through time by favoring some variants and mately based on the following logic: culling out others; the basis of this culling process is the differential success of replicators, generally via differen-1. Darwinian evolution designs adaptations tial survival and fertility of organisms that exhibit the through the action of natural selection acting upon variant traits and transmit the variant replicators unheritable variation. dergoing selection. This means that the rapidity with 2. Through cultural transmission, phenotypic variwhich selection can act is significantly constrained by ation (including behavior and artifacts) becomes herithe generation span of the organism in question. Sectable. ond, the strength of selection depends on (1) the amount 3. Undirected variation is an essential aspect of geof variation already existing in the population and netic evolution.
(2) the degree of differential fitness that the variant 4. Therefore, it is essential to cultural evolution traits confer on the individuals carrying them-matheas well. matical features of natural selection enshrined in every While we accept 1-3, we hold that 4 is a non sequitur. textbook on the subject. 6 In contrast, the rapidity with
The principle of undirected variation is certainly critwhich phenotypic response to changing environmental ical to the theory of natural selection, for reasons stated conditions occurs is dependent not on the amount of clearly in the following passage (Rindos 1989a:39): variation that already exists in a population but on the rapidity with which environmental change is occurring.
From the Darwinian perspective, undirected varia-Nor is the rapidity with which innovations can spread tion is important for its role in fueling the engine of though learning or cultural transmission necessarily deevolutionary change by generating new forms which pendent on the amount of preexisting phenotypic varimay then be subject to selection. Indeed . . . withance. This is because innovations or variants can inout a true concept of undirected variation, natural crease in frequency in a population not just through a selection is not only unnecessary but is actually imculling process acting upon existing variation but bepossible. If variation is less than undirected, then cause they in some way satisfy evolved preferences or natural selection cannot be seen as a creative force decision rules better than do existing variants (Boyd and in evolution. . . . Only if we see variation as being Richerson 1985:175). In other words, although traits produced randomly with respect to selective presadopted though social learning may well affect fitness, sures may we claim that the directionality that may their increase or decrease in frequency through time is be observed in evolution over time is the result of not necessarily through the mechanism of differential natural selection. reproduction. We believe this point is critical for understanding phenomena such as the adoption of horses or
In the genetical theory of evolution by natural selection, the ultimate source of variation is mutation of the snowmobiles. genetic code. This mutation process (along with other sources of genetic variation, such as recombination) is generally recognized to be undirected or random. What Is Behavioral Variation Analogous exactly does ''undirected'' or ''random'' mean here? It to Mutation? means that the ''chance that a specific mutation will the concept of undirected variation occur is not affected by how useful that mutation would be'' (Futuyma 1986:76), where ''useful'' refers to effects A central tenet of evolutionary archaeology is the idea on the organism's survival and reproduction (i.e., fitness that behavioral variation and innovation are undirected value). For example, the probability that the mutation or independent with respect to selection. As Dunnell that gives rise to the sickle cell trait will occur is com-(1980:62) succinctly puts it, pletely unaffected by the current prevalence of malaria. Selection determines which [behaviors] will be trans-Once the variant exists, the prevalence of malaria acts mitted, not which will occur. Behavioral variability, as a selective factor determining its frequency in the no less than mutation in strictly biological settings, population's gene pool. The production of mutations is does not direct evolution. Selection acting on varia-''undirected'' with respect to current selective advantion does. If inclusive fitness or any other evolutiontage, and hence the production of novel variation in geary concept would allow us to predict the appearnetical evolution is entirely independent of the current selective advantage of new variants. The central issue at hand, then, is whether the gener-6. This relationship between the strength of selection and the ation of behavioral variation is independent of selective amount of heritable variation also applies to cultural transmission systems (see Boyd and Richerson 1985:chap. 6 ).
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hence conceptually analogous to mutation. We argue ''Cultural systems provide a wide array of variation generating mechanisms, including rational decision mak-that it is not. While past selection does not determine when, where, how, and why a particular mutation will ing, but none of these guide evolution over the long term. That is accomplished by forces of selection and occur, it does determine to a large extent when, where, how, and why an organism will express a particular be-drift'' (p. 29, emphasis added). In a similar vein, Dunnell (1996a:xi) states: ''We see ourselves as solving problems havior (or other phenotypic state) in response to current (or even projected) environmental conditions. Although and therefore rebel at the notion that the generation of variation is random with respect to selective condi-mutations (with possible rare exceptions) are never statistically directed in fitness-enhancing directions, many tions. Yet there is absolutely no evidence that a Lamarckian engine is at work in our evolution, since we species have evolved capabilities for phenotypic modification that are indeed directed towards fitness en-have no access to future selective conditions.'' While adding the (questionable) label ''Lamarckian,'' the hancement. In the decision-rule paradigm of evolutionary ecology, these take the form ''under condition α do thrust of this statement is the same as that of Jones et al.: human innovation is adaptively random because it x, but under condition β do y'' (where x confers greater fitness benefit than y under α but less than y under β). does not anticipate future selective conditions. 8 Clearly, focusing on the ''unguided'' nature of cultural variation Of course, the directedness of behavioral innovation is a matter of degree. We expect that behavioral innova-over ''the long term'' is a radical expansion of the original axiom of the genetic theory of evolution that muta-tion will sometimes be random with respect to fitness gain, particularly in novel ecological and social settings; tion is adaptively random with respect to current selective conditions. the various problem-solving cognitive mechanisms (rational choice, scenario construction, etc.) are certainly While we certainly agree that neither behavioral variants nor mutations can be determined or caused by fu-not omniscient. Even in these cases, however, we expect that genetically evolved learning mechanisms (e.g., ture selection or anything else that has not yet occurred-cause must precede effect in any coherent operant conditioning) will reshape behavior in fitnessenhancing directions within a relatively short time (i.e., causal account-this is not a logical criticism of adaptationist or intentionalist accounts of cultural innova-less than the lifetime of an individual organism); after all, this fitness payoff is why selection designed these tion. The evolutionary archaeological argument follows superficially from the fact that the genetical theory of mechanisms in the first place. 7 Obviously, if we are correct about the generally adaptive nature of behavioral evolution by natural selection involves a two-step process: ''1) the production of undirected variation and innovation, this will often short-circuit the chance for natural selection to alter the frequencies of such be-2) the sorting of these traits by means of differential success of the variant forms over time'' (Rindos 1989b:8). havior.
We have argued above that what is true of genetic variation is not necessarily true of cultural or behavioral the future is now variation, but in any case the argument we are exploring here is distinct in that it extends the axiom of undi-In arguing that behavioral or cultural innovations are ''undirected'' with respect to selective pressures, some rected variation to refer to future selective pressures.
Why would this extension be made? Although this is evolutionary archaeologists have in fact expanded the original concept of undirected or adaptively random never fully spelled out, our best inference from the evolutionary archaeological literature and conversations variation to apply to both current and future selective conditions (i.e., conditions that do not yet exist). For ex-with several key proponents is that it serves to protect their belief that behavioral innovation is analogous to ample, Jones, Leonard, and Abbott (1995:18) state that ''innovations arise independently of the processes of se-(undirected) mutation against attack on the grounds that humans obviously do engage in directed pheno-lection. While the production of variants is to a degree constrained by preceding states of the system, the na-typic (behavioral, technological, and cultural) innovation. Thus, the counterargument goes, even when such ture of that variation is not determined by the future course of the system.'' By ''future course of the system'' innovations are consciously directed towards solving current adaptive problems, since no one can foresee fu-Jones et al. seem to mean future selective pressures, for in the next few sentences they illustrate their point by ture environmental states or other changes in selective pressures in the long run, behavioral variation is effec-arguing that many technologies have become ''far more successful in contexts unrelated to ones for which they tively undirected.
Our interpretation is supported by Neff's (1992:146) were intended originally'' (p. 18) and that ''neither individuals nor the systems they operated in could foresee claim that ''to direct evolution through innovation, humans would have to solve future problems and exploit the long string of events leading to'' the evolution of agriculture. The summary statement of this paper is future opportunities, and would have to anticipate the impact of particular solutions on conditions in the more 7. The literature on behavioral innovation and learning is of course vast; for useful reviews of the relation between innovation and 8. We term the ''Lamarckian'' label questionable because Lamarckian evolution posits that variation is responsive to present selective adaptive outcomes, see Boyd and Richerson (1985) , Marler and Terrace (1984) , and Plotkin (1994).
forces, not future ones.
long-term future.'' This argument strikes us as faulty in Although we are skeptical that trade systems (particularly the ritualized forms that occur between sovereign that it confuses the claim (of evolutionary ecology, for example) that phenotypic innovation is often effec-polities like the Southeastern chiefdoms) ''require no foresight,'' we have no objection to the rest of Rindos's tively directed at solving existing adaptive problems and opportunities with the much stronger claim that it statement. But we do not see how these factors weaken explanations based (in part) on adaptive decisions. is successful in anticipating changed adaptive conditions in the future. In doing so, this argument holds While we grant that adaptive change often has many unforeseen consequences, we wonder why this is any phenotypic adaptation to a higher standard than natural selection itself; to see this one can simply reword the more effective in emasculating the causal role of cultural innovation or behavioral adaptation than the same statement by substituting ''adaptation'' for ''innovation'' and ''natural selection'' for ''humans. '' 9 argument applied to natural selection. Surely ''over time'' the selective pressures favoring any trait (such as Having argued that innovation would have to be omniscient in order to be a significant adaptive force, many domestication) will change as ecological and demographic factors alter. In the same way, if behavioral evolutionary archaeologists conclude that most or all directional change in human history must be due to se-responses to current adaptive problems ultimately alter the adaptive landscape (e.g., through population lection. A particularly strong version of this view is that ''all change is the result of selection acting upon the un-growth), new responses to the changed conditions can be expected to arise. Only if the rate of environmental directed variant cultural forms existing at earlier points in time' ' (Rindos 1989a:28) . This logic is exemplified in change exceeds the capability for phenotypic adaptation or the changes are too subtle to be detected must we some evolutionary archaeological discussions of domestication, where the admission that people may engage assume that innovation is nonadaptive.
A related critique of the evolutionary archaeological in incipient domestication in order to increase their food supply or reduce risk is countered by arguing that position concerns its failure to recognize that humans have highly developed and evolutionarily specialized in the long run this innovation will lead to resource specialization, population growth, and hence increased re-cognitive mechanisms for projecting past experience into the future and formulating behaviors that ''antici-source variability and nutritional risk. Such unintended long-term consequences are then used to blunt the pate'' future environmental contingencies (Tooby and DeVore 1987; Byrne and Whiten 1988). This does not adaptive relevance of decisions and behavioral innovations.
mean that our explanations of such decision-making behaviors locate the cause of the behavior in its actual fu-A striking example of this kind of argument occurs in Rindos's (1989a:33, emphasis added) discussion of the ture results, nor does it mean that strategic or decisionmaking models place their explanatory emphasis on effect of maize production in the prehistoric American Southeast:
''intended effects.'' According to evolutionary ecology, the causes of a behavioral strategy are to be located in The most obvious way to deal with the interacting the interaction between an organism's evolved and factors of increasing population, increasing potential learned cognitive and problem-solving capabilities and yield, and increased variance in that yield would be its current environmental conditions. Hence, cause prean attempt to buffer the system by increased associacedes behavioral effect, and a deterministic, evolutiontion and trade within and between regions. Then, if ary theory of behavioral variation is possible. a crop is bad in one locality, maize could be im-According to evolutionary archaeology, because peoported from other localities during the crisis period.
ple cannot foresee future selective conditions or unin-This is a type of activity that requires no foresight, tended consequences of their actions, natural selection merely a response to a specific condition of immediultimately determines cultural evolution, regardless of ate reduced food availability. Furthermore, over the short-term strategic adjustments people may contime such arrangements could grow and have consesciously or unconsciously make to present conditions. quences that were totally unforeseeable at the mo-Thus, since organisms cannot foresee the changed sement that the exchange systems were initially establective conditions of the future, their phenotypic relished.
sponses are adaptively impotent and serve only as grist for selection's mill; all explanatory weight is carried by selection. Clearly this approach and evolutionary ecol-9. Neff (1992:146) in fact states the analogy to be that ''DNA molecules know nothing of future evolutionary needs or opportunities. ogy have rather different views of the relation between The same observation applies to humans who introduce innovaecological and evolutionary time scales. Since evolutions to solve perceived problems or exploit perceived opportunitionary ecology assumes that selection has designed orties.'' But the analogy is faulty on two grounds. First, DNA moleganisms to be able to solve most adaptive problems, cules can never ''know'' anything, and neither can natural selection, whereas humans do have the cognitive capability to hypotheses guided by this assumption predict that peomodel future states of the world and the impact of those states on ple (and many other organisms) will be quite capable of their survival or other fitness correlates with some degree of accuresponding to changed selective conditions with new racy. Second, as we are arguing here, the axiom of undirected variaadaptive strategies. Granted, a solution to one adaptive tion in Darwinian theory applies to the present adaptive value of variation, not any future adaptive value.
problem may lead to the emergence of new problems, b oone a nd s mith Critique of Evolutionary Archaeology S151 but this is just as true in the realm of natural selection cator) in any Darwinian sense. 10 Hence, environmental change, whether exogenous or anthropogenic, is not an as in that of behavioral problem solving. In the evolutionary ecological view, the process is a recursive one evolutionary process. We argue that human history can certainly be explained, at least in part, in terms of evo-whose causal structure can be diagrammed thus: lutionary processes, but evolutionary change and his- intentions and causes There is no finality or teleology to this view, just as A third way in which the ''selectionism'' of evolutionthere is none if one substitutes ''evolutionary adaptaary archaeology and the ''adaptationism'' of evolutiontion via natural selection'' for ''phenotypic adaptation.'' ary ecology may seem to diverge concerns the causal Of course, all behavioral strategies played out in the role of intentionality. Whereas evolutionary ecological present have some effect on future environmental theory and analysis often refer to ''decisions'' and states. For example, in the case of diet-breadth expan-''strategies'' and ''goals,'' a key programmatic element sion discussed above, the successful foraging strategies of evolutionary archaeology is denial of the explanatory of early Archaic hunters may have caused a reduction relevance of goals or intentions for evolutionary analyin the abundance of large terrestrial mammals, to which sis. For example, O'Brien and Holland (1990:44) contend later Archaic foragers had to adjust. Such effects, comthat monly termed ''unintended consequences'' (i.e., effects other than those sought by the decision-making organin one sense we can speak, rather trivially, of intent ism), may constitute ''unselected consequences'' as being a proximate cause of something, but of what well-that is, effects that alter the selective pressures analytical value is such a statement? Proximate impinging on the behavioral strategies being analyzed.
causes, in any scientific framework, are functional Explaining unintended or unselected consequences, it causes, i.e. how things work. To invoke intent as an seems to us, is primarily a historical problem, not an explanation robs valid functional questions of their evolutionary one. By this we mean that not all change interesting parts and replaces them with vitalistic, with observable material consequences (such as might directional components. show up in the archaeological record) is evolutionary Similarly, Dunnell (1989:37) writes, ''If human intenchange-descent with modification caused by evolutions cause human history and diversity, then do we tionary mechanisms such as natural selection or drift.
suppose that squirrel history and diversity, or oak tree We suspect that much of the reason some evolutionhistory and diversity, or star history and diversity are ary archaeological theorists emphasize ''future'' selecthe consequences of squirrel intentions, or oak tree intive conditions as an ultimate cause of change is their tentions, or star intentions? Generally not. These phedesire to make evolutionary theory a theory of uninnomena are understood without recourse to vitalism.'' tended consequences-that is, a science of history (see We expect most behavioral ecologists to be in general Dunnell 1982). Rindos (1989a:38-39) provides one clear agreement with both of these statements. Let us be statement of this view: careful, however, not to throw the baby out with the bathwater. Behavioral ecologists do not view behavioral Viewing variation as undirected brings about a variants, ''strategies,'' or ''decisions'' as isomorphic change in the way in which we set about atwith ''intentions.'' It is quite possible to talk about an tempting to explain cultural evolution. Here, the oak species's strategy for seed dispersal without assumspread of behaviour throughout a society, or . . . ing that trees have actual ''intentions'' in dispersing throughout the species, is the result of the fitness seeds. In general, evolutionary ecology employs such induced by that behaviour. . . . Rather than seeing strategic language as a convenient shorthand, analyzing change as a consequence of the adoption of a particadaptive design such as seed dispersal as if a plant had ular form of behaviour, emphasis is placed upon the dispersal intentions without assuming that it in fact historical consequences of a particular variant form does. In the case of organisms that do seem to have inof behaviour for the humans exhibiting that behavtentions (such as humans), these are viewed as proxiiour.
mate causes in the manner suggested by O'Brien and Our main objection to this is simple. Unintended and Holland. Ultimately, such intentions are explained as unselected consequences take the form of environmental effects as well as genetic and phenotypic ones. Some 10. In the case of coevolution between two or more populations (as environmental effects are caused by human agency, in predator-prey systems) or social interactions with fitness consequences within a population (as in mating systems or intraspecific while others, such as exogenous climate change, are resource competition), the relevant aspect of the environment for not. With respect to phenotypic changes that result, the any player does contain replicators and hence is subject to evoludistinction is not important, since humans must adjust tionary change. For that reason, evolutionary ecologists have to these new conditions either way. What is important adopted special techniques such as evolutionarily-stable-strategy theory (e.g., Maynard Smith 1982) for analyzing such dynamics.
is that the environment itself is not ''heritable'' (a repli-S152 c u r r e n t a n t h r o p o l o g y Volume 39, Supplement, June 1998 products of past (genetic or cultural) evolution; as Daly Begging the Meaningless Question: and Wilson aptly put it, ''natural selection has no goals, How Do We Explain Change? but it is the reason why organisms do' ' (1991:219) . But-and here is the nub of the dispute between the What can the evolutionary archaeological paradigm two approaches-to the extent that intentions contribgain by viewing behavior as strategic problem solving? ute to phenotypic adaptation, they produce adaptive We would answer: a great deal of explanatory power changes without concurrent selection.
that it currently lacks. Rindos (1984) eloquently charts Many evolutionary archaeological theorists seem to the evolutionary effects of plant domestication but recognize only two possibilities: either intentions exwhen considering why humans adopted domesticates in plain everything (the alleged conventional wisdom the first place concludes that this is a ''question withwhich they criticize) or they play only the minor supout meaning'' (p. 141). In the genetical theory of evoluporting role of generating undirected variation. Thus, tion by natural selection, it may well be meaningless to we are told that ''for whatever reason, anthropologists ask why, say, the sickle cell trait arose in the first place, are incapable of shrugging free of intention as the ultibecause the mutation which produced it presumably mate explanatory device (see Ramenofsky 1995) . Intenoccurred independently of its benefit to its heterozytion, however, explains nothing but how variation gous carrier (i.e., mutation is random with respect to might be generated'' (O'Brien and Holland 1995:180) . adaptive value). Selection determines only the degree to Having reduced intentionality to a black box that generwhich it would spread or persist in populations with a ates variation, O'Brien and Holland go on to undercut high incidence of malaria. It is, however, not meaningeven this role: ''This is not to say that intentions exless to ask why, for example, a forager faced with a seplain the generation of variation, only that, like a host ries of options might decide to invest more time or enof other agents, they can spawn variation.'' ergy in the propagation of plant foods. The distinction What such pronouncements overlook is the critical turns once again on the issue of undirected variation. difference between positing intentions as the root cause Given what we know about mutations, the prediction of some phenomenon and positing them (or their functhat hemoglobin mutations are more likely to occur in tional equivalent, such as the decision rules of evoareas where malaria is endemic is sure to be incorrect, lutionary ecology or the cognitive algorithms of evobut the prediction that foraging populations characterlutionary psychology) as intermediate links within a ized by sedentary settlement and resource intensificacausal pathway. Evolutionary archaeology rejects the tion are more likely to innovate by adopting cultigens first position, and because it fails even to recognize the is plausible. second it considers the matter concluded. In contrast, Other applications of evolutionary archaeology exwhile sharing its rejection of intentions as root causes, hibit the same pattern of question-begging exemplified we hold that evolutionary explanations of human hisby Rindos. Variation is noted-people were planting a tory and behavioral change generally need to include invariety of crops, people were specializing or generaliztentions or their equivalent in the causal pathway being (Leonard 1989), people were living in larger and cause these often provide the link between natural smaller settlements, some people were organizing selection and behavioral regularities. That is, past gethemselves into collective labor forces (Leonard and netic (and perhaps cultural) evolution has shaped the Reid 1993)-but in each case the behavioral variation human psyche to be very effective at solving adaptive just happens to occur. The only opportunity for explaproblems, and one important element of the psyche is nation that remains is to make up plausible post hoc what we commonly label ''intentions'' or ''goals'' or stories about why a given variant was selected for or ''preferences.'' against. This procedure seems just as susceptible to the We have pointed to both commonalities and differcharges of circularity and storytelling that are leveled ences between evolutionary ecology and evolutionary at many ''adaptationist'' explanations. Furthermore, the archaeology. In contrast with evolutionary archaeology, post hoc nature of the selectionist explanation (i.e., the evolutionary ecology posits that humans have remarkevolutionary archaeological account of why the trait able capabilities to adapt their phenotypes to their enviwas selected for or against) virtually guarantees that it ronments through learning and rational calculation. cannot be tested: it ultimately takes the form ''Such-The two approaches agree that we have the evolved caand-such was selected for because it was adaptive, and pacity for the cultural transmission of the phenotypes this is why.'' so acquired to the next generation. Taken together, this
The prevalence of selectionist ''just-so'' stories in the adaptive dynamic resembles a Lamarckian process evolutionary archaeological literature has recently been more than a strictly Darwinian one (Boyd and Richerrecognized by at least some of its proponents, and son 1985, Gould 1979). Does this mean that we are sugwe cannot improve upon the following self-critique gesting that evolution is ''directed'' by human strategic (O'Brien and Holland 1995:188) : responses to the environment, as Dunnell (quoted above) implies? Not at all. As we have argued above, These ''just-so'' stories are neat little explanations tethered loosely to evolutionary principles by the phenotypic adaptation in response to environmental conditions does not cause change, it is change.
unguarded use of the word ''selection.'' Measurable b oone a nd s mith Critique of Evolutionary Archaeology S153 variation too often becomes prima facie evidence for domesticates; (2) the process is unintentional and results from natural selection acting on adaptively ran-a groundless cause-and-effect relation between an artifact and some nebulous concept of fitness and ad-dom variation in human behavior (culturally inherited) and domesticate morphology/physiology (genetically aptation. The terms ''selection,'' ''selective forces,'' and ''selective agents'' become a ready means of un-inherited); (3) the result is generally symbiotic (enhancing the fitness of both parties) though not necessarily derstanding patterns that emerge from our analysis of data for which we have no other ready explana-stable; (4) domestication eventually leads to large increases in human population density. Of these, only 2 tion.
is either controversial or truly novel; it is also the ele-In contrast, the evolutionary ecological research ment that places Rindos's account squarely within the strategy is hypothetico-deductive, using explanatory evolutionary archaeological framework. In any case, models to develop testable predictions and then looking Rindos is at pains to differentiate his scenario from for evidence that bears on these predictions (Smith and more conventional ones in which humans intentionally Winterhalder 1992b). Why were people planting things favor more productive plant varieties or engage in selecrather than continuing to rely on wild foods? Why did tive breeding. As he puts it (1989a:34), ''cultural prothey do it where they did, when they did? Why were cesses such as innovation or discovery are processes they generalizing or specializing? Why did large settlethat permit, but do not directly cause, cultural change. ments occur in some places and not others? Why did In the case [of domestication], the true reason for culpeople organize themselves into large labor forces in tural change may be detected only in the social and desome places and not others? The logical structure of mographic consequences of agriculturally induced evolutionary ecology seems to us to be uniquely suited changes in environment and behaviour.'' For purposes to answering these kinds of questions. Once we accept of this paper, then, it is critical to consider Rindos's that behavioral innovation is not adaptively random, claim-so characteristic of evolutionary archaeologyoptimization models can be used to produce hypotheses that a ''true'' or valid explanation of domestication canregarding which environmental factors are eliciting the not assign a causal role to behavioral innovation or variation. And since these hypotheses typically incorpoproblem solving. rate specific ideas about the currency, constraints, and While a number of writers have discussed domesticarelevant environmental variables, they can be tested tion from an evolutionary ecological perspective (e.g., empirically. 11 Structuring the problem in this manner Layton, Foley, and Williams 1991, Hawkes and O'Conallows one to suggest an answer to the ''meaningless '' nell 1992 , Kaplan and Hill 1992 , Redding 1988 , the fullquestion posed by Rindos. est account is by Winterhalder and Goland (1993 and Rindos (1980 , 1984 , 1989a has been the primary evoesp. 1997). As they put it, the ''microecological'' perlutionary archaeological contributor to the literature on spective of optimal foraging theory can be used to exdomestication. As he portrays it, domestication will ocplain how low-ranked plant resources could have encur whenever certain ecological circumstances apply. tered the diet of hunter-gatherers, initiating the Specifically, when a foraging population modifies the coevolutionary relationships which created domestienvironment so as to (unintentionally) enhance the discates (Winterhalder and Goland 1997:32) . persal, survival, or pollination of a plant population,
The Winterhalder-Goland analysis relies primarily on this modification will increase the food supply of the the prey-choice model discussed above. In this model, foragers and hence favor their behavioral patterns via prey (including protodomesticates) are ranked by their natural selection (of cultural variation). Domestication postencounter profitability, which is independent of ensues when plant varieties that are genetically more their abundance or encounter rate. 12 Four categories of susceptible to human propagation and harvest are faprotodomesticates are thus possible: profitable/abunvored through human-mediated natural selection. But, dant, profitable/scarce, unprofitable/abundant, and as Rindos notes, given the symbiotic and coevoluunprofitable/scarce. While Winterhalder and Goland tionary nature of this scenario, we could just as well say discuss scenarios involving each of these four possible that plants domesticate humans as the opposite.
starting points, for brevity we will note only one, the In outline, Rindos's analysis consists of four tenets: case of a protodomesticate that is unprofitable (low-(1) domestication is fundamentally a coevolutionary ranked) but very abundant. As Winterhalder and Goland process that alters the traits of both domesticators and note, the prey-choice model predicts that such a resource will be ignored as long as higher-ranked prey are 11. In optimization theory, ''currency'' refers to the variable that is maximized by the optimal solution. In evolutionary ecology, currencies, such as resource capture rate or predator detection rate, are 12. ''Profitability'' here means expected net return (e.g., in calories) per unit handling time, where ''handling'' is defined as pursuit, cap-usually proxies for fitness, chosen because they are more readily measurable than fitness itself. (For general discussions of opti-ture, and processing (i.e., any actions required to consume a resource once it is encountered). Profitability is independent of en-mality modeling from this standpoint, see Krebs and Davies 1991 , Maynard Smith 1978 , Parker and Maynard Smith 1990 , and Ste-counter rate whenever items are handled singly or in any other way that does not create an economy of scale. For a detailed discussion phens and Krebs 1986; for applications to human behavior, see Smith 1987, Smith and Winterhalder 1992b, and various authors of these points, see Stephens and Krebs (1986:chaps. 2 and 3) or Smith (1991:204-9) . in Smith and Winterhalder 1992a.) sufficiently abundant, but if such prey decline in abun-chaeological record. Since behavior is not empirically observable in the archaeological record, the argument dance (because of localized depletion, climate or habitat change, human population growth, or any other reason), goes, we cannot study it there (e.g., Dunnell 1980:88; 1989:43) . Taken at face value, this sounds like a form the protodomesticate will be incorporated into the diet. Since in this case the protodomesticate is very abun-of radical empiricism, the tenet that science can only consider directly observable phenomena. 14 Radical em-dant, the initial result will be a major infusion of food energy into the population and a broadening of the diet piricism was once prevalent in a variety of sciences but has been widely abandoned. Indeed, such a restriction (as all higher-ranked resources will continue to be taken whenever encountered). The longer-term result will would eliminate much of nuclear physics, return psychology to 1950s-era behaviorism, cripple historical ge-be massive ecological change, as human population growth fueled by the protodomesticate produces deple-ology, and strip evolutionary paleontology to its (fossilized) bones. 15 tion of many wild resources; there will also be narrowing of the diet as the protodomesticate becomes It is characteristic of such radical empiricism that it is more readily advanced as a doctrine than adhered to ever more profitable and abundant by undergoing the coevolutionary modifications proposed by Rindos. in practice; archaeology is no exception. Perusal of the evolutionary archaeological literature reveals that vir-In their conclusions, Winterhalder and Goland discuss other approaches, including that of Rindos, and in tually the only cases in which changing artifact frequencies per se actually provide the empirical focus are fact show how an evolutionary ecological analysis can be articulated with the evolutionary archaeological em-studies of stylistic variation (Neiman 1995)-which evolutionary archaeologists have typically seen as re-phasis on unintended long-term consequences. Foraging theory can be used to illuminate the role of various eco-sulting from drift, not selection. In any case, evolutionary archaeologists are clearly interested in larger issues logical circumstances in eliciting phenotypic responses (behavioral innovations) that enhance forager fitness as well. These include the origins of domestication, population aggregation and dispersal, collective labor, and have unintended but profound consequences for human population ecology. In providing the middle-range and the origins of complex societies.
All of these topics involve whole suites of variable be-theory needed to connect selective pressures with behavioral responses, ''foraging theory can supply hypoth-haviors with which artifacts are only indirectly associated. We do not empirically observe domestication be-eses on questions the Rindos model neglects: What circumstances led humans to select certain species for ing carried out in the archaeological record; rather, we observe artifacts and ecofacts that we infer to be associ-exploitation? What are the economic and population processes that accompany growing dependence on do-ated with domestication behavior. We do not observe people aggregating or dispersing in the archaeological mesticates and cultivation?'' (Winterhalder and Goland 1997:127) . This case suggests that the two approaches record, nor do we observe small independent social groups coalescing into larger sociopolitical units. The can be complementary rather than competitive, but this complementarity requires an acknowledgment that de-archaeological record does not reveal humans exchanging goods or engaging in mobility or sedentism. What cisions and actions are fundamental to human (phenotypic) adaptation, not simply generators of adaptively we see are archaeological correlates-material entailments-of these various behaviors. Dunnell's call random variation on which natural selection will then act. 13 for archaeologists to abandon behavioral reconstruction (1989:45) has become a clarion call in evolutionary archaeology; yet as soon as we utter words like ''settle-What We See and What We Know: ment pattern'' we have already engaged in behavioral Can Archaeologists Study Behavior?
reconstruction. Hence, Dunnell's advice strikes us as almost impossible to follow in practice. In our view, the In addition to the theoretical issues discussed above, question of whether or not we can empirically study or there is a more immediate and empirically based issue that leads evolutionary archaeologists to reject a focus 14. This radical empiricism seems to have played a role in naron the analysis of behavior in archaeology. This is the rowing the way some selectionists view evolution, as seen in their view that archaeology should focus on changing artifact definition of evolution as consisting of the differential persistence frequencies through time because these are the only of variation (e.g., Dunnell 1980:38; Jones, Leonard, and Abbott phenomena that are empirically observable in the ar-1995:14; Ramenofsky 1995:135; Teltser 1995a:4, 5) . While such differential persistence is certainly fundamental to evolution, the explanatory power of Darwinian theory comes from its success in ac-13. Signs of a move towards rapprochement with (or co-optation of?) evolutionary ecology can be seen in recent suggestions that op-counting for the adaptive design of phenotypes and the creation of new designs. After all, Darwin made adaptive design and diver-timization analysis can play a valid role in evolutionary analysis. For example, Jones, Leonard, and Abbott (1995:27) refer to engi-gence his central object of explanation and entitled his magnum opus The Origin of Species (not The Differential Persistence of neering criteria and adaptive optimization as ''powerful tools in understanding the selective processes acting through ecologic rela-Variants).
15. For a recent critical review of philosophical issues concerning tions that govern technologic change'' (see also Graves and Ladefoged 1995; Maxwell 1995; O'Brien and Holland 1995:190) . ''observables'' in scientific explanation, explicating how and why unobservable phenomena are necessary and proper elements of sci-Tellingly, though, only Graves and Ladefoged cite any of the abundant evolutionary ecological literature on optimization analysis. entific investigation, see Kitcher (1993) .
infer behavior in the archaeological record is entirely through behavior. For one thing, geological or climatic factors shaping taphonomic processes cannot them-one of degree and hence of considerably less metaphysical importance than some evolutionary archaeological selves evolve in any Darwinian sense. Teltser's suggestion that evolutionary archaeology must develop new theorists (e.g., Dunnell 1989:43) would have us believe.
There is another strand to the rejection of behavioral theory to deal with behavior because evolutionary biology ''does not include the necessary terms to address be-reconstruction that turns on matters of explanatory logic rather than empirical sufficiency. This concerns havioral phenomena'' (1995a:3) would be true only if one ignored the explosion of theory and data developed the idea that behavior has no lawfulness other than that externally imposed by selection. While we share evolu-in evolutionary behavioral ecology over the past three decades (e.g., Alcock 1993, Krebs and Davies 1997). Un-tionary archaeology's skepticism concerning the inductive epistemological strategy of ''behavioral archaeol-fortunately, evolutionary archaeology seems generally to have done just that. As a result, it is just as vulnera-ogy'' (sensu Schiffer 1976), we share the latter's view that behavioral reconstruction of some sort is essential ble to the charge of parochialism and misinterpretation of Darwinism as it has shown midcentury cultural evo-to an understanding of large parts of the archaeological record. In particular, we reject the view that the absence lutionism to be (Dunnell 1980, Leonard and Jones 1987) .
Ironically, the proposal to operationalize evolution-of behavior per se from the archaeological record makes behavior an inappropriate object of archaeological ex-ary analysis strictly in terms of archaeologically observed phenomena brings its own intractable problems planation. We also reject the non sequitur that since behavior varies we cannot use it to explain the past, as in to the evolutionary archaeological program. This is particularly clear in the way selectionists have attempted the following passage: ''There is no deterministic relation between the behavioral terms of reconstruction to operationalize the concept of selection in the analysis of archaeological change. Since selection is inargu-and the debris of the archaeological record. Such a relation would have to be founded in laws, and behavioral ably a dynamic process while the archaeological record is essentially static (Binford 1983:19-20) , we cannot ac-laws, as just noted, cannot exist because behavior changes. Without a deterministic relation between the tually observe selection occurring in the record any more than we can observe behaviors. In a very influen-two, behavioral explanations are untestable in the archaeological record'' (Dunnell 1992:216) . That behavior tial article on patterns of artifact frequency change, Dunnell (1978) attempted to solve this problem by ar-''changes'' does not make behavioral explanations ''untestable'' any more than changes in selective forces guing that any sustained directional change in the frequency of an artifact type is a sign of selection at work. 16 make selectionist explanations untestable. Indeed, from the evolutionary ecological perspective (as well as most But what might be true for genetic evolution and on palaeontological time scales seems to us far more prob-of behavioral biology and social science), the regularities (''deterministic relation'') between behavior and the lematic in an archaeological or historical context. The well-documented secular trends of increased stature archaeological record in fact derive from behavioral change that responds to variation in social and natural and earlier age at menarche (Eveleth and Tanner 1990, Wood 1994), for instance, while quite directional and environments.
Furthermore, one does not have to adopt a ''law and sustained (having continued for centuries in some populations) and of considerable magnitude (e.g., up to 30% order'' (Flannery 1973) view of behavior in order to posit regularities between behavior and the archaeological reduction in menarcheal age in some populations), clearly result not from selection or any other form of record. In fact, the evolutionary archaeological framework only makes sense if there are regularities between evolutionary change but from phenotypic programs that respond to varying nutritional input with varying environmental factors and archaeological change, regularities which work via selection, drift, and other evolu-growth and maturation rates. A more archaeological example of the same process is the case of change in the tionary mechanisms. Evolutionary ecology adds the assumption that regularities also are instantiated via character of the osteological remains in some stratified sequence, the early occupants of a site or region having phenotypic adaptation, including behavioral and technological responses. It also posits that many behavioral very robust skeletal structure while later occupants are more gracile. Barring migration, this could be due to regularities (decision rules) are predictable because these have been designed by past natural selection. evolution in robusticity (e.g., due to declining selection pressure for channeling energy to bone growth or even As we argued above with respect to ''intentions,'' one does not have to view behavioral factors as root causes to drift in a small population) or to phenotypic adjustments (maturing bones subject to less stress develop of historical change to consider them important parts of historical (including archaeological) explanation. While less robustly). The former change is evolutionary, while the latter is not. Or skeletal remains might show a dia-we recognize that ''because the archaeological record does not provide any direct observational access to hu-chronic increase in signs of nutritional stress (e.g., Harman behavior, the methods used in an evolutionary archaeology will look very different than, for example, an 16. Dunnell's argument has become a fundamental axiom in the evolutionary ethnography'' (Teltser 1995a:3), we insist evolutionary archaeological literature; see, for example, Jones, that evolutionary explanations of the archaeological Leonard, and Abbott (1995) , Neiman (1995), O'Brien and Holland (1990, 1992, 1995) , among others. record must implicitly or explicitly trace causality S156 c u r r e n t a n t h r o p o l o g y Volume 39, Supplement, June 1998 ris lines); this again is phenotypic rather than evolution-Natural selection (and other evolutionary forces) may shape behavioral variation in another way, through a ary change. By positing natural selection as the only source of sustained directional change, evolutionary ar-distinct process of cultural evolution. The degree of independence of cultural evolution from genetic evolu-chaeological theorists have become prisoners of their limited explanatory framework. tion is as yet unresolved (e.g., Boyd and Richerson 1985 , Durham 1991 , Flinn 1997 , Rindos 1985 . Whether or not one accepts a distinct and autonomous role for cultural evolution, there is no need to banish behavior and Conclusion decision making from the explanatory framework of evolutionary archaeology. Virtually all animals and plants have evolved at least some capacity to adjust phenotypically to varying envi-While the theory of natural selection provides a powerful explanatory mechanism, it becomes even more ronmental conditions. Therefore many environmental changes will produce a change in the observed mean powerful when linked with other concepts, including some from the social sciences. Indeed, the rich develop-phenotype of a population without any selection or evolutionary change. Put another way, variable phenotypic ments in contemporary evolutionary theory (e.g., Maynard Smith 1982, Krebs and Davies 1997) would not adjustment by individuals in a population to changing environmental conditions does not just constitute have been possible without extensive borrowing from decision theory and economics. Those wishing to ana-''variation'' as raw material for selection; it constitutes a form of nonrandom, directional adaptive change in lyze human society, behavior, and technological change using evolutionary theory would be far better off emu-and of itself. In humans, the capacity for problem solving and for adapting phenotypically to a wide range of lating this judicious borrowing and adaptation of social science concepts (cf. various authors in Smith and Win-environmental conditions is highly developed (and a product of our evolutionary history). The material en-terhalder 1992a) than heeding evolutionary archaeology's dismissal of any elements of social science and de-tailments of these processes produce an observable archaeological record of adaptive change. We have argued cision theory as metaphysically tainted.
For archaeology, one of the major implications of the that explanation of this kind of adaptive change requires a specific kind of evolutionary logic. A central distinction between evolutionary ecology and the evolutionary archaeology program critiqued here concerns goal of this paper has been to outline this logic, show how it differs from the evolutionary archaeological use the relation between archaeological evidence-temporally and spatially varying occurrences of artifacts, eco-of the concept of selection, and suggest that adopting it can produce more powerful explanations of adaptive facts, features, and sites-and processes of evolutionary change. The evolutionary archaeologists see temporal change in the archaeological record.
Evolutionary archaeologists do not generally deny variation in the frequencies of these archaeological entities as evolutionary change per se. This view is exempli-that behavior may involve problem solving or that behavioral variation may occur as much by design as by fied in Dunnell's (1978) argument that directional changes in artifact frequencies signal selection at work chance (e.g., Rindos 1989b:13-15; O'Brien and Holland 1990:44-45). They do, however, consistently deny that while stochastic changes reflect the evolutionary process of drift. It appears that one of the main attractions the problem-solving nature of behavior has any role to play in the explanation of phenotypic change over time. of this line of reasoning is the extremely (and in our view overly) simple and direct link that is implied Again, this seemingly contradictory view stems from their insistence on adopting a strict genetic analogy, between archaeological data and the powerful, wellestablished (in biology) theory of evolution by natural with the two-step (unguided variation, selection) process of evolutionary change it entails. In contrast, evo-selection.
In contrast, we hold that while the application of evo-lutionary ecologists argue that behavioral variation (including innovation) is at least partially guided by lutionary theory to archaeology can lead to important gains in explanatory power, it offers no quick fixes. As perceived costs and benefits linked to environmental variation. a subset of modern evolutionary theory, evolutionary ecology is a rich source of ideas, but it is a theory about We expect that all parties can agree that variation in artifact frequencies and spatial patterning through time behavior, not about the archaeological record per se.
Hence, we foresee a continuing, active program of re-and across space must ultimately be produced by behavioral variation (in conjunction with taphonomic and search and analysis dealing with the relationship between past behavior and the formation of the archaeo-other nonbehavioral factors). Yet directional and adaptive behavioral change need not be directly the result of logical record in the tradition of Binford's (1992) ''middle-range theory, '' Schiffer's (1976 '' Schiffer's ( , 1987 ''behav-evolutionary processes such as natural selection or drift. Instead, it may be due in large part to facultative ioral archaeology,'' and ethnoarchaeology as defined by O'Connell (1995) . What has been conspicuously lacking phenotypic response to varying environmental conditions. However, even in this case natural selection ulti-from this research is a powerful and coherent theory of behavior that can underlie and unify middle-range the-mately helps to explain behavioral variation, since the capacity to respond behaviorally and, indeed, very often ory. We agree with O'Connell (1995) that evolutionary ecology could remedy this need. adaptively is an evolved capacity. This is the fundamental tenet of evolutionary ecology.
Evolutionary archaeology's claim that archaeologists b oone a nd s mith Critique of Evolutionary Archaeology S157
can explain the archaeological record by applying natu-have no direct acquaintance with the works of evolutionary archaeology discussed by the authors, but as-ral selection theory directly to observable features of this record is based on several misconstruals of evolu-suming that their account is fair it seems that the evolutionary archaeological theorists think that the only tionary biology and cultural evolution. As discussed above, attempts to apply evolutionary explanations di-way to be hardheaded and scientific about the Darwinian evolution of culture is to deny all intention, all ra-rectly to artifact frequencies or other observable aspects of the archaeological record typically ignore the pheno-tionality, on the part of human culture makers. They opt for ''selection rather than decision making.'' That is type-replicator relation and the distinct mechanisms and complexities pertaining to cultural transmission. simply a mistake, for the same reason it would be a mistake to say that the fancy plumage of prize pigeons is The evolutionary archaeological research program appears to be driven more by an empiricist metaphysic-the result of decision making rather than selection. But Boone and Smith seem to fall into the same trap. For now widely abandoned as unworkable and unnecessary in other sciences-than by the logical entailments of instance, they are surely right that the adoption of snowmobiles by the Cree cannot be accounted for in Darwinian evolution. Virtually ignored by the proponents of this approach, the evolutionary ecological terms of the differential biological replication of the snowmobile users, but they misread the more interest-framework is increasingly being employed to explain phenotypic variation in both ethnographic and archaeo-ing meme's-eye view (Dawkins, 1976 , Dennett 1995 .
They say: ''The alternative that 'snowmobile memes' logical contexts. We feel confident in concluding that not only is it possible to study behavior and ecological were transmitted more effectively than 'snowshoe memes' to nondescendant Cree (as well as offspring), adaptation in the archaeological record but indeed we must do so if we expect to make evolutionary sense while plausible, is not natural selection [emphasis added]; more significant, it requires precisely the kind of it.
of adaptive decision making that evolutionary archaeology is dedicated to eliminating from archaeological explanation.'' On the contrary, from a meme's-eye perspective in which the snowmobile meme is seen as the Comments replicator with its own fitness, just like the fitness of the domesticated horses that spread so quickly among the Native Americans after their introduction, then cul-d an iel denn ett Center for Cognitive Studies, Tufts University, tural evolution can be seen to be due to ''adaptive decision making'' while also being a variety of natural selec-Medford, Mass. 02155, U.S.A. 22 vii 97 tion. Some memes are like domesticated animals; they are This essay brings into sharp relief a ubiquitous confusion that has dogged discussions of cultural evolution, prized for their benefits, and their replication is closely fostered and relatively well understood by their human one deriving, I suspect, from a subtle misreading of Darwin's original use of artificial selection (deliberate ani-owners. Some memes are more like rats; they thrive in the human environment in spite of being positively se-mal breeding) and ''unconscious'' selection (the unwitting promotion of favored offspring of domesticated lected against-ineffectually-by their unwilling hosts.
And some are more like bacteria or viruses, comman-animals) as bridges to his concept of natural selection. While it is true that Darwin wished to contrast the utter deering aspects of human behavior (provoking sneezing, for instance) in their ''efforts'' to propagate from host to lack of foresight or intention in natural selection with the deliberate goal seeking of the artificial selectors in host. There is artificial selection of ''good'' memessuch as the memes of arithmetic and writing, which are order to show how the natural process could in principle proceed without any mentality at all, he did not carefully taught to each new generation. And there is unconscious selection of memes of all sorts-such as thereby establish (as many seem to have supposed) that deliberate, goal-directed, intentional selection is not a the subtle mutations in pronunciation that spread through linguistic groups, presumably with some effi-subvariety of natural selection. The short legs of dachshunds and the huge udders of Holsteins are just as much ciency advantage but perhaps just hitchhiking on some quirk of human preference. And there is unconscious products of natural selection as the wings of the eagle; they simply evolved in an environment that included a selection of memes that are positively a menace but prey on flaws in the human decision-making apparatus, particularly well-focused selective pressure consisting of human agents. These phenotypes fall under the same as provided for in the genome and enhanced and adjusted by other cultural innovations-such as the ab-laws of transmission genetics, the same replicator dynamics, as any others-as special and extreme cases in ducted-by-aliens meme, which makes perfect sense when its own fitness as a cultural replicator is consid-which the default ''randomness'' or noisiness of selective pressure has been greatly reduced. ered. The antagonism between the evolutionary archaeo-Applied to cultural evolution, the implication is this: There is no conflict between the claim that artifacts (in-logical and evolutionary ecological camps is perhaps then due to an overshooting by both sides: the former cluding abstract artifacts-memes) are the products of natural selection and the claim that they are (often) the sees the prospect of an evolutionary account of artifacts and ideas that treats human beings as ''mere'' vectors, (foreseen) products of intentional human activity. I and the latter sees the prospect of providing evolution-be sure, the individual agent, sculpted by both culture and evolutionary selection, is important in all institu-ary accounts of the adaptive strategies made possible by the plasticity of the human phenotypes, and neither tional contexts, but the properties of the institutionsfor example, the male supremacy complex in local side sees how the two perspectives can be put together-but they can be. The genetic evolution of basic groups (Harris 1977) and the competitive political economy in chiefdoms (Earle 1997)-dominate (or channel) behavioral capacities and dispositions and preferences creates highly versatile human phenotypes whose individual behavior. The revolution of macroeconomics, as a further example, recognized that the operation norms of reaction are immense and largely fitnessenhancing. But these developments bring into existence of economic systems cannot be reduced to individual rationality; labor, capital, and monetary flows have a medium of cultural transmission that engenders a new genre of replicators, and while some of these are properties that must be modeled and understood.
Neither evolutionary archaeology nor evolutionary favored by and in turn enhance the adaptive strategies already laid down, others exploit them ''for their own ecology considers how institutions are built up, operate, and determine human behavior, on the one hand, and benefit.'' Evolutionary archaeology should pursue all these phenomena together. Both sides win; both sides the artifactual record, on the other. Although group selection has been shown to be theoretically inadequate have a contribution to make. and functionalist assumptions are in disfavor, institutional dynamics are evidently critical to the operation of human society and must be understood to explain t imothy ea rle Department of Anthropology, Northwestern long-term evolutionary processes. Anthropology's concern with institutions is of long standing, because the University, 1810 Hinman Ave., Evanston, Ill. 60208, U.S.A. 29 vii 97 physical reality of clans, lineages, chiefdoms, churches, businesses, bureaucracies, and the like, determines much of what happens in human lives. Boone and Smith provide a focused and convincing critique of Dunnell's school of evolutionary archaeology Selection is central to the evolutionary theories considered in this article. But what determines the genetic and as an alternative offer evolutionary ecology, a set of behavioral explanations derived from optimal foraging fitness of a human? Certainly much has to do with personal decisions about subsistence, mating, display, theory. I am sympathetic to their theoretical positions. While evolutionary archaeology is to be applauded for competition, and the rest. Behavioral ecology offers intriguing explanations of these. In complex society, how-its attention to the archaeological record per se, the school is naive to assume that one can understand ar-ever, a person's reproductive success and cultural impact are more likely an outcome of institutional chaeology without understanding the human behavior, society, and culture that produced it. Boone and Smith affiliation and context. Whether one is a king or a pauper, a member of a large clan or of a small one, an urban instead focus on human behavior and the evolutionary roots of human cognitive abilities. They sit on the inter-craftsman or a rural farmer, Muslim or Hindu fundamentally determines the nature of one's life and activi-faces between evolutionary biology, cognitive science, and economics. These interfaces offer extraordinary op-ties in particular societies. Choices are heavily constrained in ways that are very basic to complex human portunities for an integrated theory of human behavior, but as with all reductive theories, the limitations are societies. These are problems of how individuals associate and how they identify and control each other's ac-profound. What is missing is an understanding of the emergent properties of larger systems and social institu-tivities. The evolution of human society involves the formation of institutions and the maintenance of power tions.
In their review of evolutionary theories in archaeol-relationships within and between them (see, for example, DeMarrais, Castillo, and Earle 1996, Earle 1997). ogy and anthropology, Boone and Smith, somewhat surprisingly, ignore processual archaeology. Processual archaeology has a long history that derives from Steward's (1955; Harris 1977, Johnson and Earle 1987) theory of terry l. hunt, mark e. madsen, a nd c arl p. l ip o multilinear cultural evolution (for example, Binford 1972 , Blanton et al. 1996 , Earle and Preucel 1987 , Flan-Department of Anthropology, University of Hawai'i, 2424 Maile Way, Honolulu, Hawaii 96822, U.S.A. nery 1972 , Wright 1984 Washington, Seattle, U.S.A. (clipo@u.washington.edu) (Lipo) . 4 ix 97 behavior and movement (see, for example, Kelly 1995), but a profound difference observed in human life experiences cross-culturally is in the scale of institutional This paper raises several significant issues with regard to the ongoing challenge of building an evolutionary ar-elaboration: family-level, local groups, chiefdoms, states, and world systems (Johnson and Earle 1987) . To chaeology. In the effort to create a polemic, however, b oone a nd s mith Critique of Evolutionary Archaeology S159 it does little more than caricature a continuing, indeed, in contrast to the timelike (historical) frames of evolution (Dunnell 1982; see also Elster 1983) . As a conse-nascent, discussion-conflating or simplifying many critical points and driving a wedge between comple-quence, they overlook the critical explanatory significance of variation. Their central claim therefore mentary aspects of ecology and evolution in Darwinian theory. As a consequence, some will seize upon this pa-represents neither the position of evolutionary ecologists nor the ''Darwinian'' approach in general. per as a warrant for abandoning the effort to bring historical science to anthropology. We think that this Boone and Smith rightly point out that archaeologists need to begin taking formal models of cultural trans-would be unfortunate.
Boone and Smith argue that the problem with evolu-mission seriously (e.g., Boyd and Richerson 1985) as part of a general mathematization of our reasoning, data tionary archaeology lies in its ''flawed grasp of evolutionary biology, not in its advocacy of Darwinism per description, and testing. Formal models will be necessary to test hypotheses of culturally transmitted rep-se.'' They offer instead what they believe is ''a conceptually more complex but realistic view of phenotypic licators and the phenotypes they create, a difficult task whether one is referring to genetic or cultural in-variation.'' Central to their argument is the familiar, decidedly non-Darwinian claim that ''organisms (includ-formation-to-phenotype linkages. Nevertheless, most advocates of an evolutionary archaeology understand ing humans) have been designed by selection to make extensive adaptive adjustments to their phenotypes. . . . the need for a clearly articulated theory of cultural transmission if evolution in phenotypes is to be studied Under this view, natural selection's primary role lies in accounting for these cognitive mechanisms.'' rigorously. The mechanics and quantitative properties of transmission cannot be studied in the fossil record; This claim is empirical, not theoretical. The argument is that many organisms including humans have instead we must combine formal modeling and experimental study with living animals to work out the de-developed behavioral systems so efficient that they act optimally and adaptively with no effective role for natu-tails. What falls to archaeology today is the task of deriving expectations from theories of transmission and ral selection in their operation and persistence. Such a position is at home in anthropology, where teleological selection that can be rewritten in a form measurable in a fossil record of behavior and morphology. Whether the causation has dominated the non-Darwinian paradigm of cultural evolution (e.g., Harris 1979; see Dunnell models involved are of selection or neutrality, evolutionary archaeologists have begun the difficult task of 1980 , Richerson 1977 , Smith 1983 . Despite its significance, Boone and Smith do not attempt to substantiate bringing individual-based models into concordance with the time-averaged pooled archaeological record of their empirical claim of human adaptiveness independent of selection but merely assume its truth as axiom-patterned behavior and multiple phenotypes (e.g., Lipo et al. n.d.) . However, unlike Boone and Smith, we be-atic.
But such a claim is not widely shared by evolutionary lieve that the strictures of science require the subject matter to be the record itself, not the untestable behav-ecologists. Stephens and Krebs (1986), for example, point out that foraging theories are formal models of op-ioral reconstructions imagined from ethnographic analogies. In this regard, we oppose the uncritical use of be-timal behaviors given specific assumptions, specific environments, and biological constraints. Among the rea-havioral reconstruction (e.g., following Schiffer [e.g., 1976 Schiffer [e.g., , 1996 ] and his students) as an empirically suffi-sons for testing formal models they list ''to ask how good organisms are at doing their jobs,'' ''to ask what cient strategy for archaeological research.
In our view, and we suspect the view of the majority animals are designed to do,'' and ''to analyze behavioral mechanisms'' (p. 183). Theoretical models in evolution-of evolutionary ecologists and evolutionary archaeologists, it is the anthropological baggage of cultural evolu-ary ecology are measurement tools; they are heuristica point made often and by many (e.g., Bettinger 1986; tion and the reification of theory from tool to empirical reality that reveal Boone and Smith's central claim to Krebs and Davies 1987; Maynard Smith 1978; Smith 1987:205) . In short, the use of notions of optimality, de-be misguided. cision making, adaptiveness, etc., derived from field biology or microeconomics does not eliminate the causal role of natural selection or other evolutionary processes g eo rge t. j o ne s Department of Anthropology, Hamilton College, in explaining genetic or cultural change.
Boone and Smith have confused empirical observa-Clinton, N.Y. 13323, U.S.A. 5 ix 97 tions (and heuristic assumptions) about the behavior of humans with the theory used to explain that behavior. Boone and Smith make a persuasive argument that phenotypic adaptation, not natural selection or drift, has They assume things that we might seek to understand in scientific terms and thus confuse description with been the primary force guiding human cultural evolution, perhaps since the rise of anatomically modern hu-explanation. Such confusion is, unfortunately, common to the mainstream empiricism of the social sciences mans. Their case builds from several observations about humans, among which are unprecedented behavioral (Willer and Willer 1973) . At another scale, they conflate the explanatory structure of ecology and evolution, plasticity, the capacity for facultative response to opportunity and constraint, and the rapidity with which imagining that differential persistence in the long term can simply be conceived in spacelike (functional) terms these evaluations may be transmitted by cultural means. They deny that natural selection is directly in-adoption of the snowmobile by Cree hunters was rapid-within a generation. This does seem to support volved in most instances of adaptively significant cultural change because the pace of cultural change is too a mechanism other than natural selection for the success of this technology. But can we claim from the ex-rapid to be monitored by biological reproduction. In their view, the technologies and organizational strate-ample that there have been or will be no consequences for biological fitness or, to move into a less certain gies of humans evolve, to be sure, but this is not because external conditions favor some variants over oth-realm, for cultural reproduction, let us say in the fitness of decision-rule variants? To evaluate these questions, ers through differential fitness but because of a more direct process, adaptation.
along with a longer time series we would need a less inclusive scale, for instance, comparing corporate This view asks selectionists to reconsider the mechanism behind change, abandoning a view that technol-groups with differential access to snowmobile technology or groups whose foraging territories differ in re-ogy and behavior are directly under the influence of selective pressures for a view more akin to artificial source quality.
In the end, I am intrigued by Boone and Smith's no-selection. The external environment to which humans adapt culturally represents opportunities and con-tions of decision rules and have further appreciation for the cascading effects of cultural transmission at that straints in the literal, not the metaphorical sense, since humans can identify them and ruminate on the best scale of analysis. They have striking consequences for what might be phrased as cultural founder effects. course of action to enhance success. In the chain of causal statements explaining change, then, the environ-These mechanisms are not, however, as clearly responsible as natural selection and drift for longer-term pat-ment is more distant and decision making more proximate to the events under scrutiny. If natural selection terns that archaeologists regularly consider. plays any role, it is in engineering decision rules or cognitive algorithms, which Boone and Smith claim guide adaptive responses. These decision rules, which are m arc kodac k U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 1222 Spruce St., PD-C, readily transmitted culturally, are products of selection and perhaps evolved deep in human history. We do not St. Louis, Mo. 63103, U.S.A. (kodack@smtp.mvs. usace.army.mil) . 18 viii 97 learn from this discussion, however, whether these rules show phenotypic variability or are mutable-in short, whether natural selection might still be acting on Boone and Smith have provided a valuable comparison and needed critique of the two dominant uses of Dar-them. In fact, we do not learn of the empirical status of these rules at all, that is, whether they are traits that winian theory in archaeology. They label these approaches evolutionary archaeology and evolutionary natural selection really can work on. For a science professing a materialist outlook, this reliance on what in ecology. As an example of how they differ, Boone and Smith examine how Winterhalder's (1981) work on the other theoretical guises amounts to norms or elementary structures seems inappropriate; one wonders if adoption of snowmobiles by the Cree in the mid-1970s is explained by each. They suggest that Ramenofsky's competition between individuals or among corporate groups or serious failures to implement rules correctly interpretation that natural selection is directly at work in the adoption of snowmobiles fails to consider the have evolutionary consequences.
According to Boone and Smith, phenotypic adaptabil-decision-making plasticity of Cree foragers. This plasticity is continually stressed throughout their discus-ity is the most parsimonious explanation of rapid adoption or abandonment of behavioral or technological sion. I suggest, however, that the entire Cree example is variants. How else, after all, can we explain the rate and scale of adoption of much modern material culture of flawed, regardless of which interpretation one accepts.
Neither accounts for all the costs that would enter into apparently little selective value (unless one subscribes to the fitness value of waste)? In this view, we no longer the decision making of a typical Cree forager ca. 1975.
Although Winterhalder (1981:71) discounted the cost of maintain the key distinction between mechanisms of transmission and of proximate cause, on the one hand, the purchase of the snowmobile and the fuel to operate it, the costs are not insignificant; hard currency is lim-and those relating to the persistence of variants across many generations, on the other. Drift and selection dis-ited but necessary to obtain the snowmobile and fuel in the community of Muskrat Dam Lake, where Win-appear; the steady application of decision rules, generation by generation, will yield the same directional or terhalder conducted his research.
If we view a snowmobile as a material good that static patterns of behavioral variant representation. But how can it be shown that this is a result of adaptation passes through many phases during its useful life, we can divide a snowmobile's life-cycle cost into at least rather than selection when even the effects of single biological traits on reproductive fitness are so difficult to three phases: (1) initial purchase cost, (2) maintenance, and (3) eventual replacement. Although adopting snow-measure?
Given the difficulty of showing that phenotypic mobiles increased foraging efficiency among the Cree, thus permitting higher return rates, Winterhalder and, adaptability rather than natural selection is the operative mechanism in most cultural change, do the exam-subsequently, Boone and Smith have assumed that all Cree hunters could embrace this method for higher for-ples support Boone and Smith's claims? Certainly the b oone a nd s mith Critique of Evolutionary Archaeology S161 aging efficiency. However, for some Cree hunters living tion through the construction of containers that look to us like pots. in Muskrat Dam Lake in 1975, the limited hard currency available to them coupled with an assessment of the overall life-cycle costs of a snowmobile may have led them to forgo a snowmobile and continue to use snowshoes in hunting instead. Thus, the decision to use r obe rt l. ke ll y Department of Anthropology, University of Wyoming, ''new'' technology may have been economic and not based on a way to increase foraging efficiency. The Laramie, Wyo. 82071, U.S.A. 3 ix 97 worst-case scenario would be if a ''successful'' traditional Cree hunter could not afford a snowmobile; he I strongly agree with Boone and Smith's critique of evolutionary archaeology. Although human populations would be forced to forgo a method of hunting that would further increase his foraging efficiency.
are at some level affected by the same selective processes as affect all organic life, humans are different be-In not considering or discussing how hard currency affects decision making, Boone and Smith miss the op-cause they have a ''response'' time that is less than a generation, acquired traits are ''passed down'' from par-portunity to demonstrate how an evolutionary ecological approach can incorporate the impact of Western eco-ents, peers, and/or others, and innovation is not simply a function of random mutation and thus ''undirected.'' nomic systems on our understanding of traditional subsistence economies through such models as optimal But selection (beyond selection that occurred in the distant past to create the plastic behavioral capacity of hu-foraging and diet breadth. In fact, Smith has considered sub-Arctic forager participation in a mixed economy in mans) may have occurred and still be occurring. My problem with evolutionary archaeology is that it tends his study among the Inujjuamiut (Smith 1991:357-97) .
Using this study instead of the Cree case would have to mask, obscure or gloss over past human behavior to the point where the paradigm is no longer useful as a strengthened Boone and Smith's argument that evolutionary ecology can be used in both archaeological and learning strategy. I agree that evolutionary ecology provides a better learning strategy (and has far more em-ethnographic settings. The Inujjuamiut case study would also have highlighted the weakness of evolution-pirical cases to its credit); I don't see evolutionary archaeology providing a method for determining the ary archaeological explanations in general and Ramenofsky's in particular by showing that they are too truthfulness of its assertions. The high ratio of theoretical to empirical treatises is telling. quick to embrace the direct action of natural selection as an explanation of human behavior. Additionally, It is still unclear to me whether evolutionary archaeology attributes directional change to the replicative Ramenofsky's explanation ignores the significant influences and methodological difficulties that forager success of the trait or to the direct increased reproductive fitness of its bearers. Both seem to be potentially at participation in a mixed economy has for explanations incorporating natural selection. Smith (1991:368-70) at work. If a man comes up with a new projectile point or hunting tactic that cuts the cost of harvesting game and least attempts to identify and then confront these difficulties.
increases his return rate, it is reasonable to assume that his neighbor will copy that behavior unless something I presume that if we were to introduce mobile globalpositioning-system equipment and mobile satellite limits access to the technology or start-up costs (e.g., knowledge, manufacturing skills) are too high or the telephones into Cree society of 1997, even if all available hunters had equal access to snowmobiles, we could proposed change would reduce the user's ability to meet another cultural goal that the neighbor perceives as again cite economic reasons and not evolutionary archaeological or evolutionary ecological explanations for more important (and presumably has or had adaptive benefits). Perhaps, then, selection in the strict sense (of further increasing the efficiency of these foragers. We should consider how ''new'' technology confers value the bearers of a trait) gains strength as a force over phenotypic adaptation in cultural change along some gradi-on very accurate locational information about the distribution and density of mobile and sessile resources. ent of increasing cost of adopting a new tactic or technology. We could then ask under what circumstances this locational information would be defended (see Dyson- For example, some argue that about 1,000 years ago speakers of Numic languages migrated into the Great Hudson and Smith 1978).
Elsewhere, Boone and Smith discuss how evolution-Basin of western North America and replaced (or subsumed) the existing ''non-Numa'' population. Bettinger ary ecology can incorporate intention into its explanations. I find it ironic that Richard Dawkins, often cited (e.g., Bettinger and Baumhoff 1982) argues that the non-Numa were nomadic and took high-return-rate re-by evolutionary archaeologists, discusses intention when he compares (1996:16) the differences between sources such as large game; the Numa were less nomadic and had a broader diet, including small seeds and evolutionary processes and designoids. In the case of the potter wasp and the mason bee, ''the wasp and the bee pinyon nuts, utilizing some different technologies (e.g., seed beaters) and tactics (e.g., green-cone-pinyon pro-didn't consciously or deliberately design their pots. . . .
[They have] no concept of a pot as a work of art, or as curement). Bettinger argues that the Numa outcompeted the non-Numa, who migrated, became extinct, or a container'' (Dawkins 1996:16) . The wasp and the bee are ''working'' to provide protection for the next genera-intermarried and lost their language. A common re-sponse to this scenario is: Why didn't the non-Numa is shorter here than in the lowlands. Pests are a constant threat, yet major impacts tend to be localized. Technol-adopt the Numa's behavior?
One reason could be that the Numa's foraging tactics ogy includes a variety of chipped stone tools, digging sticks, and hoes. Farmers may plant early and/or late in carried a cost that was perceived as too high by non-Numa. Among many foragers, sharing meat from large the spring to avoid killing spring and fall frosts and may plant in single fields or many. While most farmers take game is a primary way men acquire prestige and possibly more mating opportunities and/or resources for advantage of simple technology that increases water runoff onto fields, others dry-farm. Males are the farm-their offspring; among others, men devote time directly to giving resources and attention to their offspring ers, and land is held by women. Cultural transmission occurs obliquely when a boy's mother's brother teaches (Kelly 1995) . If the Numa came from an environment in which the latter tactic conferred greater fitness than the him how to farm. Transmission occurs horizontally when farmers share knowledge. How to be a good former, then they would have imported this trait into the Basin. Non-Numa men might have been reluctant farmer is encoded in religious teachings, and ritual objects serve as mnemonic devices that also provide in-to give up hunting even if in the long term that choice made them less competitive, as they might have seen struction in acceptable farming practices. Farmers who generate successful harvests are much admired, and only the perceived loss in status and benefits that would result from forgoing an opportunity to hunt in order to their consultation and advice are appreciated. Hero myths are constructed around a few. If necessary, weave collect small game or to care for children.
Likewise, women's foraging is affected by whether into this picture the vicissitudes of meaningful human life, however you see them. children tag along and whether they collect some of their own food (see Hawkes 1996) . Without children, If I am understanding Boone and Smith correctly, in evolutionary ecological terms the behavior of this hypo-women can collect at higher return rates. The amount of foraging that children do is linked to how easy it is thetical society has been designed by natural selection to make extensive adaptive adjustments or exhibit phe-to get food and how dangerous foraging is for children (this would have been the same for the Numa and non-notypic plasticity. The extent of these behaviors over a range of environmental conditions is called the reaction Numa) and also by the perceived availability of caretakers. In some foraging societies, children have multiple norm. Decision rules-here learned behavior-guide what people do, not natural selection. Explanations are caregivers; in others the mother is the primary caregiver. What if Numa women entered from an environ-often constructed in terms of efficiency and costs and benefits, among other factors that might influence deci-ment in which a notion of child care prevailed (presumably because it bestowed greater adaptive advantage) sion rules. Here human intent plays a role, as individuals may indeed direct the course of their own existence, that resulted in their leaving children at camp and this allowed them to forage more efficiently than non-at least in part. Boone and Smith assert that this perspective yields valuable understandings of human be-Numa women and, presumably, raise more offspring to adulthood?
havior. I agree. I particularly value it for explaining the evolved behavior of contemporary and historic peoples These factors may have resulted in a higher growth rate for the Numa, resulting in their ''takeover'' of the within a synchronic framework. Now let us push this society through time for a few Great Basin. This scenario may or may not be correct, but the more general points are that human cultural be-thousand years or so, letting them build an archaeological record that represents aspects of the reaction norm havior may be under selection à la evolutionary archaeology in only a limited range of cases; seeing technology and decision rules for times t 1, t 2, t 3. Given the environment specified above and human ingenuity at generat-as part of the phenotype and not also as a reflection of behavior (the tactics) that is part of the phenotype could ing variation (or attempts at problem solving, if you prefer), few readers would be surprised if the archaeological be misleading (i.e., behavioral reconstruction is somewhat necessary); the frequencies of behaviors in a popu-record of our group exhibited changing reaction norms as well as decision rules. The varied strategies and tac-lation, as evolutionary ecology argues, are largely the outcome of individuals' making decisions among often tics of production should exhibit differential success in response to changing environmental conditions. Some conflicting goals within natural and social environments that set different payoffs to different behaviors.
behaviors and technologies may be dropped from the repertoire completely as new ones are generated. From time t 1 through t 3 our hypothetical society has constantly been in the process of becoming something else, r ob ert d. l e on ard Department of Anthropology, University of New with associated new reaction norms and decision rules. Importantly, and as evolutionary biologists have taught Mexico, Albuquerque, N.M. 87131, U.S.A. (rleonard@unm.edu) . 6 ix 97 us, it is never possible for our hypothetical society to reattain a previous state, given the vagaries of history that influence evolution. Let us consider a hypothetical society of farmers trying to make a living in an arid environment. Rainfall is un-To the evolutionary archaeologist this is human evolution. Evolutionary archaeologists seek to account for predictable and may be highly localized. The uplands tend to receive more moisture, but the growing season change in human behavior primarily in terms of the evolutionary processes of natural selection, sorting, and of making decisions. We can safely assume that it has provided us with a means for adaptive decision making, drift. Intent and individual or group efforts to direct the course of evolution are irrelevant at this scale, as the and as archaeologists we can exploit this assumption for developing models of past behaviour. But such models generation of variation, however knowledgeable and directed, is independent of natural selection. All of our need to be based at the level of individual behaviour, and to operationalise them we need to take into account problem-solving farmers intended success as they employed their technologies and thus indirectly influenced the formation processes of the archaeological record (Mithen 1993) . One solution as to how we can move the course of evolution.
However, not all succeeded, and through time, the from the short-term decisions of past individuals to the long-term, aggregate patterns of the archaeological rec-operation of the evolutionary processes of natural selection, sorting, and drift likely would have continually ord is by using computer simulation as a methodological tool. and irrevocably changed the society. To the evolutionary archaeologist, explanation of these changes is I must, however, raise three issues regarding this ''adaptive decision-making'' apparatus that we carry achieved in part by isolating the relative importance of these mechanisms through time in evolutionary con-within our minds/brains. Perhaps the most important is whether we have a single, general-purpose decision-text. Evolutionary archaeologists assert that this perspective yields valuable understandings of the evolu-making/learning device or multiple devices each having been selected to solve a different adaptive problem tion of human behavior. I agree.
To understand why evolutionary archaeologists adopt in our evolutionary past. The weight of the evidence from psychology (e.g., Hirschfeld and Gelman 1994) and the metaphysical position they do, interested readers might examine the literature discussing the differences human evolution (Mithen 1996) suggests strongly that it is the latter. This has very considerable consequences between timelike and spacelike frameworks, as illustrated above. They may also want to examine the exten-for how an evolutionary ecological approach to human behaviour can be developed, especially when dealing sive biological literature that discusses the different, yet interdependent, metaphysics of evolution and ecology. with behaviour for which specialised adaptive decisionmaking devices are likely to be absent. Because the pace of culture change has been so rapid during the past 50,000 years-during which we assume s te v en mith en Department of Archaeology, University of Reading, that the decision-making devices of the mind/brain have not evolved-we may be inherently unsuited to Whiteknights, P.O. Box 218, Reading RG6 6AA, England. 4 vii 97 making adaptive decisions in relation to a whole range of problems found in the modern world (e.g., should we create genetically engineered foods? should we use new I am in complete agreement with the views expressed by Boone and Smith: evolutionary archaeology is a medical technologies to keep extremely premature babies alive?). Moreover, when faced with these problems doomed enterprise based on flawed theoretical premises that can make no significant contribution to our expla-for which we do not have an evolved decision-making device, we may apply one suited to a different type of nation of the variability in the archaeological record and our understanding of past behaviour. The reasons for problem, with highly maladaptive results. In this regard, adopting an evolutionary ecological approach in this are sufficiently well described in their article that I have no reason to repeat or expand upon them (as I which emphasis is placed on evolved cognitive mechanisms does not constitute an adaptationist programme. have done elsewhere [Mithen 1997]) . How cultural selectionism/evolutionary archaeology can have been A second but related issue is the narrow range of behaviours to which an evolutionary ecological approach taken so seriously for so many years and how so many new publications adopting this approach continue to is currently applied. It is fine for tackling the ''food and sex stuff'' about human behaviour-these are precisely appear in the literature is quite beyond me. Similarly, I am repeatedly surprised that prestigious academics the problems for which adaptive decision-making cognitive devices are likely to have evolved. Thus archaeol-whose other work I highly respect seem to take seriously the notion of ''memes'' as a cultural equivalent ogists adopting an evolutionary ecological approach have had some success at understanding the food of genes (e.g., Dennett 1996): the notion of ''memes'' is simply fallacious, the vital differences between choices made by past people and technological choices when these directly impinge on food acquisition and, in ''memes'' and genes having been exposed by Lake (1996) . Therefore, while I applaud this article by Boone anthropological contexts, when tackling issues such as mate choice. But at present this Darwinian approach ap-and Smith, I am also saddened and irritated that such an article is necessary at all. pears to have little to say about aspects of human behaviour which do not have such direct bearing on repro-My strong feelings on this issue no doubt arise from the fact that I have written at length in support of the ductive success, such as which art style to choose or which religious entities to believe in. Unless archaeolo-evolutionary ecological approach in archaeology. In my 1990 book I put forward the argument that natural se-gists who adopt an evolutionary ecological approach begin tackling these issues rather than just focusing on lection is relevant in our discipline only with regard to how it has shaped the human mind/brain-our means subsistence, their approach will never become widely employed within the discipline: free rein will be given of this interbedding of behaviour or what I have termed ''cognitive fluidity.'' Of course, a problem we face is to theoretically flawed approaches (e.g., evolutionary archaeology) which seek legitimation by aligning them-that their development and application become more difficult as we go farther back into human evolution be-selves with a Darwinian paradigm, and evolutionary ecology will remain the preserve of hunter-gatherer spe-cause of the increasingly coarse grain of the archaeological record. cialists alone.
There is certainly potential for developing a Darwin-In summary, I agree wholeheartedly with Boone and Smith's critique of evolutionary archaeology and sup-ian archaeology which can address issues with a less direct bearing on reproductive success than foraging and port their espousal of evolutionary ecology in archaeology. But at present, this remains as narrow in the types mate choice (i.e., food and sex). But to do so we must delve deeper into the evolutionary history of the mind/ of human behaviour that it tackles as it did two decades ago, when exactly the same generalisations about brain and go beyond making vague generalisations about evolved cognitive mechanisms for decision mak-evolved decision-making cognitive devices were being made. I want to see much greater attention paid to the ing, as I myself have attempted to do (Mithen 1996) . As archaeologists we need to build stronger links with evo-nature of evolved mechanisms in the mind and a more explicit recognition that a Darwinian archaeology does lutionary psychologists (who also need to work more closely with archaeologists to achieve their own aims) not constitute an adaptationist programme. I believe we need greater willingness to tackle nonsubsistence-so that we can develop more sophisticated models of evolved decision-making devices and, more generally, related issues in archaeology from this perspective and to acknowledge that models developed for other forag-of how our minds work. An example of the work to which we can perhaps aspire is Pascal Boyer's (1994) ing species may not be as easily applicable to modern humans as has been previously argued. These com-study of the transmission of religious ideas. In this he shows how an understanding of evolved mental mecha-ments are not meant to detract from the value of Boone and Smith's paper, and I certainly want to see a much nisms can constrain the likelihood with which different religious ideas can survive the rigours of cultural trans-greater application in archaeology of foraging models in which explicit reference is made to individual decision mission.
A third issue I wish to raise is that of multiple goals. making of precisely the type they describe. I simply think that the evolutionary ecological approach they When an optimal-foraging/decision-making model is developed, one normally assumes a single goal, such as support is capable of making a far greater impact on our understanding of human behaviour in the past and pres-minimising risk or maximising the rate of energy intake (or the ''meliorising'' equivalents [Mithen 1989b]) . The ent than is currently the case. application of the model evaluates the likelihood of achieving this goal, together with whether one has correctly identified the constraints under which decision a nn f. ra me nofs ky Department of Anthropology, University of New making takes place. The problem of multiple goals is present when dealing with any animal species, but it be-Mexico, Albuquerque, N.M. 87131, U.S.A. (aramenof@unm.edu.) 8 ix 97 comes particularly acute when dealing with humans. Subsistence behaviour, for instance, is so thoroughly embedded in social and ideological behaviour that deci-''Is It Evolution Yet?'' is a timely and important contribution to the developing theory of evolution in anthro-sions about which foodstuffs to exploit are made in light of many competing goals-to satisfy one's nutri-pology. For too long evolutionary archaeology and evolutionary ecology have worked in isolation. I am tional needs, to secure food to share, to gain highprestige food, to conform to ideological beliefs about hopeful that this article signals a change in which mutual benefits outweigh costs. Although there is much appropriate foods to eat, etc. This interaction of a multiplicity of goals has been made most clear in rela-in it that is worthy of in-depth discussion, I restrict my comments to Boone and Smith's criticisms of my work tion to projectile points, the design of which among modern humans is clearly made in light of a wide range on native artifact replacement.
The basis for Boone and Smith's criticism is one sen-of social, economic, and ideological factors (e.g., Wiessner 1993) . I believe that this problem of the complex in-tence in which I link the spread of snowmobiles among the Cree to the success of the horse in North America. terbedding of any activity in multiple domains of behaviour is a particular feature of modern humans The spread of the horse occurred over approximately 100 years, that of snowmobiles in less than a genera-(Mithen 1996) and consequently creates problems in the development of optimal-foraging/decision-making tion. As Boone and Smith state, the Cree example is too brief in evolutionary time to consider Darwinian selec-models not faced by ecologists dealing with other animal species. Indeed, the foraging models currently ap-tion as the mechanism of change, but selection was not the point. I linked the two introduced technologies to plied to modern hunter-gatherers as described by Boone and Smith, which are largely unmodified from those show that adoption is ongoing; at some later time snowmobiles may become grist for the evolutionary mill. used for other animals, are probably more appropriate for premodern human behaviour prior to the emergence Their criticism is, however, out of context, because b oone a nd s mith Critique of Evolutionary Archaeology S165 my paper in press is not about Cree or snowmobiles; a evolutionary time, have built cognitive structures in which individuals make optimal decisions. Focusing on continuation of ideas published in 1995, it is a preliminary effort to build an evolutionary archaeological de-behavior facilitates examining whether or not decisions maximize fitness. scription of why European artifacts replace native artifacts, with a ''replacement'' defined as ''adoption and My conception of evolution is strongly influenced by Hull's units, the replicator and the interactor (Hull persistence.'' Dunnell's concept of function (as fitness costs) frames the discussion, and I consider how Euro-1980 Euro- , 1981 Euro- , 1988 Euro- , 1994 . His definitions free replicators and interactors of a particular taxonomic level. In addi-pean and Native American raw materials could affect individual fitness differentially, resulting in replace-tion, depending on circumstances, the same entity can function as both replicator and interactor. Using these ment.
My approach contrasts with the culture-contact liter-units to measure and track change has significant ramifications for evolutionary description and explanation. ature on artifact change and with Winterhalder's research with the Cree (1977, 1980, 1981) . Accultura-First, artifacts can be the focus of investigation, making our task the determination of whether and in what tionists describe and explain artifact change. Although their descriptions are rich in detail, their explanations ways alternative traits differ in fitness. Slight differences in costs can have consequences over evolutionary are problematic. They lodge explanation in the adoption process or the superiority of European products and time. Secondly, evolutionary pathways are quirky and unpredictable. This very quirkiness raises fundamental technologies, both incomplete in evolutionary terms. Because evolution is a two-stage process, adoption can-questions about evolved cognition and optimality. Because we are historical documents, it is possible that not explain persistence. If we assume that artifacts contribute to fitness, survival of populations is partially a historical cognitive structures and circumstances sometimes conflict, resulting in decisions that are less than consequence of artifacts. The survival of human populations on both sides of the Atlantic suggests that, though optimal and may reduce fitness. In this case, we need to rethink whether universal optimality is a fruitful different, artifacts were perfectly adequate, The theoretical point is that cultural transmission makes decisions that individuals make an evolutionary then portrayals of artifact change by acculturationists, Winterhalder's account still misses the mark because force much like natural selection. One outcome of the coupling of deliberate invention and strategic adoption he embeds snowmobile adoption in foraging theory. Boone and Smith consider this an acceptable explana-of innovations to transmission by social learning is to make even very weak, marginal decision making an tion for snowmobile adoption, but I am less convinced, especially in light of the sweep of artifact replacements agent of rapid change at the population level in the long run. Indeed, the main hypothesis to emerge from the in Cree hunting equipment-rifles, canvas canoes followed by outboards, and wire traps (Rogers 1954; Win-theorizing of Boyd and Richerson (1985) was that the great adaptive advantage of the cultural system in a terhalder 1977, 1981) .
The snowmobile case highlights significant differ-highly variable environment such as the Pleistocene stems from the substantial increase in rate of evolution ences between the two evolutionary approaches. They are girded by different concepts and assumptions, and possible when weak, low-cost but statistically adaptive decision rules supplement natural selection. Very because we do not know which, if any, of these are correct, I believe that serious intellectual discussion must crudely, what we call the costly-information hypothesis holds that decision-making forces and natural selection begin with them. Boone and Smith, for instance, adopt a narrow view of Dawkins's evolutionary units, the rep-acting on cultural variation ought to be equally important. We say ''crudely'' because it is impossible to pre-licator and the vehicle (Dawkins 1978 (Dawkins , 1982 (Dawkins , 1989 . Artifacts cannot be the focus of investigation because arti-dict the mixture quantitatively without knowing much more than we do about the costs and benefits of setting facts are not replicators. Genes are replicators and, over S166 c u r r e n t a n t h r o p o l o g y Volume 39, Supplement, June 1998 up decision-making and culture-transmitting psycholo-portance of selection and decision-making forces directly in living societies. As far as we are aware, there gies. One way of portraying the debate between evolutionary archaeology and evolutionary ecology is to say is only one set of data that comes close to doing this. Roof and McKinney (1987:chap. 5 ) present data derived that they have different intuitions about the relative importance of decision making and natural selection in from questionnaires estimating the effects of birthrates (selection) and switching (decisions) on the net growth causing cultural evolution. The costly-information hypothesis suggests that this is an entirely reasonable de-rates of groups of churches in the United States. There are striking effects of selection. The biggest discrepancy bate. The extremes-all selection or all decision making-are equally unlikely, yet the debates in all fields is between black and conservative white Protestants and those with no affiliation. People with no affiliation of the social sciences tend to portray rational-actor theory and culture-historical explanations (of which the have only a little more than half as many children as the two types of conservative Protestants. Conserva-evolutionary archaeological account is a particular theoretically motivated version) as competing rather than tives also have about a 30% birthrate advantage over liberal Protestants. Decision making also has a big ef-ultimately complementary.
The empirical point is obvious: we need to estimate fect, especially on loss rates from liberal and moderate Protestant churches. Historically, liberal churches, per-the strength of decision-making and selective effects in a broad sample of cases before we can make any general-haps because they were socially more prestigious, attracted considerable net switching from moderate izations. Unsophisticated wet-finger-to-the-wind empiricism suggests that the costly-information hypothe-churches. Among younger people, this flow has slowed to a balance of switching in and out, while the net loss sis is plausible. Consider stock archaeological patterns: The origins of agriculture, the rise of states, and other to nonaffiliation is about 9% of the number born to liberal churches. Among under-age-45 people, conserva-major features of cultural evolution are events with time scales of millennia, yet over millennia fantastic tive white churches have a slight net gain (5%) over other churches and a slight net loss (3%) to nonaffilia-changes in and diversifications of cultural adaptations occur. Cultural evolution is too slow to be explained en-tion. Thus, conservative Protestant churches are growing because their birthrate is well above replacement tirely by individual strategizing but much faster than unaided organic evolution, consistent with a mixture of and because they mostly hang onto these kids. The liberal churches are well below replacement fecundity, selective and decision-making forces. Archaeologists could make this argument much more quantitative. Pa-suffer significant net losses to nonaffiliation, and have lost their attractiveness as vehicles of status mobility. leontologists have measured the rates of organic evolution in terms of a unit known as the ''darwin,'' where One study is a grossly insufficient test of the costlyinformation hypothesis, but it exemplifies the pattern 1 darwin is a change by the factor e, the base of the natural logarithms, in a character per million years (see dis-it predicts; decision making and selection are both important in this case. There is a nice irony in the discov-cussion in Ridley 1993: chap. 19). A fair number of such rates have been measured and can be used as a yardstick ery that the success of conservative Protestants stems in large part from natural selection. to see if rates of cultural evolution do really generally exceed those of organic evolution. For example, since the end of the Pleistocene human societies have increased in size from averages of perhaps 1,000 to an av-p atr ice te l tse r Department of Sociology and Anthropology, Lehigh erage of perhaps 1,000,000 in the past 10,000 years. This gives a rate of change of ca. 700 darwins, compared with University, Bethlehem, Pa. 18015, U.S.A. 8 ix 97 a range of 0.11-32.0 darwins in a sample of 46 morphological characters from post-Pleistocene mammals Boone and Smith's critique of evolutionary archaeology centers on its failure to accommodate the empirical (Gingerich 1983). Human societies are clearly evolving very rapidly, and the evolutionary force of decision consequences of cultural transmission. Evolutionary archaeologists maintain that natural selection acts on making is a candidate for explaining why. Some hints might come out of a large sample of evolutionary rates. heritable (genetic or cultural) phenotypic (physiological or behavioral) variation contributing to an individual's The theory suggests that in domains where judgments are easy, individual decisions should be strong forces fitness. This position runs into problems. Natural selection is tied to reproductive success, and because it is and evolution correspondingly rapid. The Cree's adoption of snowmobiles is an example. In general, we confined to parent-offspring relationships it is constrained by the rate at which biological organisms re-might expect that in many domains of technology diffusion, easy-to-try-out, easy-to-acquire innovations will produce. Cultural transmission, however, is not confined to parent-offspring relationships, it does not spread rapidly. Contrariwise, social organizational innovations are hard to observe (just how do polygynists necessarily imply reproduction, and behavioral change within populations can occur more rapidly than biologi-manage the complexities of multiwife households? monogamous ones try most of us) and hard to try out (the cal generations reproduce. The consequences of this position are significant but unnecessary. Evolutionary range of marriage institutions one can experiment with in one lifetime is strictly limited).
ecologists maintain that natural selection accounts for phenotypic plasticity-in this case cognitive abilities It also should be possible to measure the relative im-b oone a nd s mith Critique of Evolutionary Archaeology S167 enabling organisms to vary their behavior in response ary ecologists would identify the innovation as the incorporation of horses and associated technology into a to environmental change. Thus, whereas evolutionary archaeology identifies directional changes in trait fre-new behavioral context. In this case their criticism would be justified. The evolutionary archaeologists' po-quencies as the result of natural selection, evolutionary ecology might attribute the same changes to adaptive sition does not imply a theory of unintended consequences, but given what they identify as the innovation adjustments (phenotypic variation).
While I agree with the central conclusions of Boone it often turns out that way. More to the point, however, their position on human intention and innovation is and Smith's critique, they raise many issues requiring clarification and refinement from both sides. The two better explained as a reaction to the privileged position and causal role these mechanisms have been given by fields have quite different points of departure-evolutionary ecology from an ethnographic perspective, evo-more firmly entrenched models of cultural evolution.
Boone and Smith seem to recognize this issue without lutionary archaeology from an archaeological one. These differences incorporate long-term concerns over fully appreciating its significance.
Nevertheless, while attempting to create a distance different methodological issues. The question what is or can be observed goes far beyond the role of behavioral between Darwinian and cultural explanations, evolutionary archaeologists may have become victims of reconstruction to a concern with identifying appropriate units of measurement, the perspective of time-their own rhetoric and, as Boone and Smith suggest, ''thrown the baby out with the bath water.'' The ten-scale, and more mundane issues such as chronological resolution. Consequently, what Boone and Smith might dency to trivialize functional explanations and privilege evolutionary ones is pervasive in the evolutionary ar-regard as a flawed grasp of evolutionary biology may reflect a more sophisticated methodological appreciation chaeological literature and undermines its proponents' ability to provide a clear accounting for the mecha-than they recognize.
Their example of the snowmobile and the horse (e.g., nisms underlying selection. While attempting to expunge behavior in response to the inductive epistemo-Ramenofsky 1995; Winterhalder 1980, 1981) provides a useful illustration for many points. In the Plains exam-logical strategy they have adopted they have somehow forgotten to include that theoretical principles must be ple, the perspective of a broader time-scale with which archaeologists generally operate reveals an unprece-written in behavioral terms, that archaeologists must invent the methodology (Binford 1964) to apply them, dented population, suggesting more than phenotypic adjustment. For example, horses and related technology and that behavioral inferences are explanations (Neiman 1990) . effectively raised the carrying capacity of the Plains environment, providing the means to support higher pop-In sum, evolutionary archaeologists face significant limitations in their failure to accommodate the empiri-ulation densities than were previously possible. While the source of people included refugee populations, the cal consequences of cultural transmission. To address these issues may require shedding some hazardous rhet-viability and persistence of higher population densities should reflect something about reproductive fitness. oric currently associated with the program rather than necessarily retreating from any basic theoretical prem-Boone and Smith's basic argument-that adoption of the horses can be best understood in terms of adaptive ises. Failure to do so will deny them access to a theory of behavior consistent with Darwinian principles and decision-making rules-remains cogent, however, and the difference underscores one of their critical points. some much-needed methodological equipment. By refusing to recognize the relevance of any mechanisms to effect phenotypic adjustments (e.g., decisionmaking rules), evolutionary archaeologists are at a loss to account for the mechanisms underlying selection. As Reply Boone and Smith argue, in the absence of the ''postulate that evolved cognitive abilities allow foragers to weigh the economic costs and benefits . . . and to choose e ric ald en smit h an d jam e s l. bo o n e Seattle, Wash./Albuquerque, N.M., U.S.A. 15 xi 97 [which one] gives the highest energy return . . . the intimate strategic relationship between foraging technology and diet breadth would remain theoretically The diversity of reactions to our article mirrors the controversy and lack of agreement that characterize the opaque.'' Criticism of the evolutionary archaeological position evolutionary study of human behavior and culture. This suggests that the sample of commentators is a represen-on undirected variation and human intention is more a matter of what constitutes the ''innovation'' than a tative one, but it of course does not facilitate a compact reply. We have grouped our responses under five head-fundamental theoretical disagreement. Evolutionary archaeologists identify the European introduction of ings: the definition of natural selection, the explanatory logic of phenotypic adaptation, the relative causal effi-horses and associated technology to the North American continent as the ''innovation.'' In this context, it is cacy of each of these forces in shaping human behavior and its products, the effects of temporal scale and histo-unlikely that the Europeans' intention was to provide Native Americans with the means to remain viable ricity, and the problem of explaining complex social processes and institutions. populations. If I understand them correctly, evolution-
